Aug 19 - Update test files

tests/test_external_inspector.py

@@ -15,10 +15,13 @@ Runs on the in-memory SQLite app fixture (multi-tenancy inert). Covers:
   * facility / inspection / issue list routes stay scoped for the new role
   * the notification matrix exposes an External Inspector column whose defaults
     mirror the Inspector column
-  * creating an external inspector sends an invitation instead of setting a
-    password: password_set is False and a set-password token is minted
+  * an invited Customer Inspector is created with password_set False and a
+    set-password token, and cannot log in until they use it
   * creating any other role still requires a password
-  * the assign-contracts page accepts an external inspector (it 404'd before)
+  * creating a Customer Inspector goes through Customer Management, and
+    User Management no longer offers the role (phase51)
+  * the staff assign-contracts page redirects a customer-side account to
+    the page that owns it, and still serves our own inspectors
 
 The regression guard that matters most is
 test_external_inspector_scope_is_not_unrestricted: if a future edit reverts a
@@ -224,23 +227,27 @@ def test_matrix_defaults_mirror_the_inspector_column(client):
 # ── Invitation flow ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 def test_creating_external_inspector_invites_instead_of_setting_password(client):
+    """phase51 moved this account type to Customer Management.
+
+    The invariant is unchanged and is what this test guards: a Customer
+    Inspector is INVITED, never given a password we chose. Only the door
+    changed — /customers/new instead of /auth/users/new — because both
+    customer-side roles are now owned by /customers.
+    """
     from app.models.user import User
 
     env = _seed()
     _login(client, env['admin'])
 
-    resp = client.post('/auth/users/new', data={
-        'username': 'newxan',
+    resp = client.post('/customers/new', data={
         'full_name': 'New Xan',
         'email': 'newxan@example.com',
         'role': 'external_inspector',
-        'password': '',
-        'confirm_password': '',
     }, follow_redirects=True)
     assert resp.status_code == 200
 
-    created = User.query.filter_by(username='newxan').first()
-    assert created is not None, 'external inspector was not created'
+    created = User.query.filter_by(email='newxan@example.com').first()
+    assert created is not None, 'customer inspector was not created'
     assert created.role == 'external_inspector'
     # Invited, not password-set: login is blocked until they use the link.
     assert created.password_set is False
@@ -248,22 +255,42 @@ def test_creating_external_inspector_invites_instead_of_setting_password(client)
     assert created.set_password_token_expires is not None
 
 
+def test_user_management_no_longer_creates_customer_side_accounts(client):
+    """The other half of the move: User Management must not mint one.
+
+    UserForm stopped offering 'external_inspector', so a crafted POST hits
+    SelectField validation and nothing is created. Without this, a second
+    creation path could quietly reappear and skip the invitation flow.
+    """
+    from app.models.user import User
+
+    env = _seed()
+    _login(client, env['admin'])
+
+    client.post('/auth/users/new', data={
+        'username': 'sneaky',
+        'full_name': 'Sneaky Xan',
+        'email': 'sneaky@example.com',
+        'role': 'external_inspector',
+        'password': '',
+        'confirm_password': '',
+    }, follow_redirects=True)
+    assert User.query.filter_by(username='sneaky').first() is None
+
+
 def test_invited_external_inspector_cannot_log_in_until_setup(client):
     from app.models.user import User
 
     env = _seed()
     _login(client, env['admin'])
-    client.post('/auth/users/new', data={
-        'username': 'newxan',
+    client.post('/customers/new', data={
         'full_name': 'New Xan',
         'email': 'newxan@example.com',
         'role': 'external_inspector',
-        'password': '',
-        'confirm_password': '',
     }, follow_redirects=True)
     client.get('/auth/logout', follow_redirects=True)
 
-    created = User.query.filter_by(username='newxan').first()
+    created = User.query.filter_by(email='newxan@example.com').first()
     # The placeholder hash is random, so no password can work; assert the
     # account is in the blocked state rather than guessing a credential.
     assert created.password_set is False
@@ -289,11 +316,31 @@ def test_creating_a_normal_role_still_requires_a_password(client):
 
 # ── Assign-contracts page ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-def test_assign_contracts_page_accepts_external_inspector(client):
+def test_assign_contracts_page_redirects_customer_side_to_customer_management(client):
+    """phase51: one editor per account, not two.
+
+    The staff assign-contracts URL still exists for our own inspectors, but a
+    customer-side account is redirected to the page that now owns it. Editing
+    one through UserForm would fail anyway — 'external_inspector' is no longer
+    an offered role choice, so SelectField would reject the stored value.
+    """
     env = _seed()
     _login(client, env['admin'])
 
     resp = client.get(f"/auth/users/{env['external'].id}/assign-contracts")
+    assert resp.status_code == 302
+    assert f"/customers/{env['external'].id}" in resp.headers['Location']
+
+    # …and the page it redirects to is the real editor.
+    assert client.get(f"/customers/{env['external'].id}").status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_assign_contracts_page_still_accepts_our_own_inspector(client):
+    """The staff path must not have been broken by the redirect guard."""
+    env = _seed()
+    _login(client, env['admin'])
+
+    resp = client.get(f"/auth/users/{env['internal'].id}/assign-contracts")
     assert resp.status_code == 200