"""
app/tenancy/session_binding.py
------------------------------
MT-21: bind a browser session to the tenant that issued it.

Why this exists
---------------
Every tenant is served by the same Flask application with the same
``SECRET_KEY``. Before this module, nothing in a signed cookie identified
*which* tenant it was issued by, so a cookie minted on one tenant host
validated perfectly on another:

    1. A legitimate user of tenant A logs in at a.jqc.app.
    2. They copy their session cookie onto b.jqc.app (devtools / curl —
       host-only cookie scoping stops the *browser* replaying it, but not a
       person doing it by hand).
    3. The tenancy middleware resolves Host → tenant B and binds tenant B's
       database.
    4. Flask-Login calls load_user('7') and gets **tenant B's user #7**.

The signature was always valid, because it is the same key. The identity was
never checked against the tenant. Result: authentication as an arbitrary user
in any tenant whose hostname the attacker knows.

Two layers close this, and both live here:

``SESSION_TENANT_KEY``
    A ``_tenant_id`` marker written into the session at every point where the
    session starts carrying identity (login, MFA challenge hand-off,
    impersonation). ``enforce_session_tenant()`` clears the whole session when
    that marker disagrees with the resolved tenant, so pre-authentication
    session state (``mfa_pending_user_id`` and friends) cannot cross tenants
    either.

``tag_user_id`` / ``parse_user_id``
    Flask-Login derives BOTH the session ``_user_id`` and the "remember me"
    cookie payload from ``User.get_id()``, and feeds both back through
    ``user_loader``. Tagging the id there — ``"<tenant_id>:<user_id>"`` — is
    therefore a single seam that covers both cookies. Clearing the session
    alone would not have been enough: a remember-me cookie repopulates the
    session immediately afterwards.

Single-tenant behaviour is unchanged. When ``MULTI_TENANT_ENABLED`` is False,
or no tenant is bound (cron, CLI, exempt paths), ids stay bare integers and
the enforcement is a no-op.
"""

import logging

from flask import current_app, g, session

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

SESSION_TENANT_KEY = '_tenant_id'


def current_tenant_id():
    """Resolved tenant id for this request, or None in single-tenant mode."""
    if not current_app.config.get('MULTI_TENANT_ENABLED', False):
        return None
    tenant = getattr(g, 'tenant', None)
    return tenant.id if tenant is not None else None


def bind_session_tenant():
    """Stamp the current session with the tenant that issued it.

    Called at every point that puts identity into the session. No-op in
    single-tenant mode so existing sessions keep working untouched.
    """
    tid = current_tenant_id()
    if tid is not None:
        session[SESSION_TENANT_KEY] = tid


def enforce_session_tenant():
    """Clear the session if it was issued by a different tenant.

    Returns True when the session was cleared. Runs after tenant resolution,
    from the tenancy middleware.
    """
    tid = current_tenant_id()
    if tid is None:
        return False

    bound = session.get(SESSION_TENANT_KEY)

    if bound is None:
        # An untagged session carrying identity predates this binding, or was
        # lifted from somewhere else. Either way it cannot be trusted here.
        if '_user_id' in session or 'mfa_pending_user_id' in session:
            logger.warning('TENANCY | session_untagged_cleared | tenant=%s', tid)
            session.clear()
            return True
        return False

    if bound != tid:
        logger.warning('TENANCY | session_tenant_mismatch | bound=%s resolved=%s',
                       bound, tid)
        session.clear()
        return True

    return False


def tag_user_id(user_id):
    """Render a Flask-Login identity string, tenant-tagged when applicable.

    Used by ``User.get_id()``. Feeds both the session ``_user_id`` and the
    remember-me cookie.
    """
    tid = current_tenant_id()
    if tid is None:
        return str(user_id)
    return f'{tid}:{user_id}'


def parse_user_id(raw):
    """Inverse of :func:`tag_user_id`, with the tenant check applied.

    Returns the integer user id, or None when the identity must be rejected —
    a foreign tenant tag, an untagged id arriving in multi-tenant mode, or
    anything unparseable. ``user_loader`` turns None into an anonymous user,
    which sends the caller back to the login page.
    """
    if raw is None:
        return None
    raw = str(raw)
    tid = current_tenant_id()

    if ':' in raw:
        tag, _, uid = raw.partition(':')
        if tid is None:
            # Tagged id replayed at a single-tenant / unbound context.
            return None
        try:
            if int(tag) != tid:
                logger.warning('TENANCY | user_id_tenant_mismatch | tag=%s resolved=%s',
                               tag, tid)
                return None
        except (TypeError, ValueError):
            return None
    else:
        uid = raw
        if tid is not None:
            # Untagged id in multi-tenant mode: either a session predating
            # MT-21 or one lifted from another host. Force re-authentication.
            logger.warning('TENANCY | user_id_untagged_rejected | tenant=%s', tid)
            return None

    try:
        return int(uid)
    except (TypeError, ValueError):
        return None