Aug 17 - Fix customer inspector out-of-scope issue assign

app/routes/inspections.py

@@ -608,11 +608,10 @@ def execute(inspection_id):
             flash('Draft saved. You can continue filling in the form later.', 'success')
             return redirect(url_for('inspections.execute', inspection_id=inspection_id))
 
-    staff_for_flag_issue = User.query.filter(
-        User.role.in_(['director', 'inspector', 'external_inspector',
-                       'project_manager', 'auditor']),
-        User.active == True,
-    ).order_by(User.full_name, User.username).all()
+    # Scoped to this inspection's contract — see _assignable_staff_for().
+    # Must match flag_issue()'s choices exactly or the offcanvas silently
+    # fails to save (rule 60).
+    staff_for_flag_issue = _assignable_staff_for(inspection, current_user)
 
     return render_template('inspections/execute.html',
                            inspection=inspection,
@@ -923,6 +922,95 @@ def view(inspection_id):
 
 # ── Flag issue during inspection ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+#: Internal roles that are NOT contract-scoped — they work across the whole
+#: organisation, so they are offered regardless of which contract the
+#: inspection belongs to. Only ever shown to our own people.
+_ORG_WIDE_ASSIGNEE_ROLES = ('director', 'project_manager', 'auditor')
+
+
+def _assignable_staff_for(inspection, actor):
+    """Users `actor` may assign an issue to, for THIS inspection.
+
+    The candidate list is scoped by the inspection's CONTRACT, not taken
+    org-wide. Two distinct problems this fixes:
+
+    1. **Cross-customer leak.** A Customer Inspector could assign an issue to
+       anyone in the system — including another client's Customer Inspector.
+       The assignee is notified by email and in-app with the facility name and
+       issue description, so this handed one customer's data to another. It is
+       a leak whoever flags the issue, so the contract scope is applied to the
+       two inspector roles for EVERY actor, not just customer ones.
+
+    2. An external account should not see our internal org chart at all. For a
+       customer-side actor the list is their co-workers on shared contracts —
+       inspectors assigned to this inspection's contract — and nothing else.
+
+    Rules applied:
+      * inspector / external_inspector  -> only those holding an
+        InspectorAssignment on this inspection's contract (the same rows
+        get_inspector_scope() reads, so the list can never disagree with what
+        the assignee can actually open).
+      * director / project_manager / auditor -> org-wide, but offered ONLY to
+        our own staff. These roles carry no InspectorAssignment rows, so
+        contract-scoping them would remove them entirely and break the normal
+        "escalate to the contract manager" flow.
+      * inactive accounts are never offered.
+
+    A facility with no contract yields no contract-scoped candidates; that is
+    fail-closed and correct — an external actor then gets an empty list and can
+    only leave the issue unassigned.
+
+    Used by BOTH the offcanvas dropdown in execute() and the choices that
+    validate the POST in flag_issue(). They MUST stay identical: a value the UI
+    offers but the choices reject fails `validate_on_submit()`, and the
+    offcanvas JS treats the resulting 200 as success — the issue is silently
+    never saved (rule 60's failure mode, which is exactly what the two
+    hand-maintained lists were already doing to project_manager and auditor).
+    """
+    from app.models.inspector_assignment import InspectorAssignment
+
+    # `is_customer_account` is used here to WITHHOLD internal staff from an
+    # external account — the narrowing direction, which rule 89 permits. It
+    # must never be used to grant a customer-side account anything.
+    actor_is_external = bool(actor) and actor.is_customer_account
+
+    project_id = inspection.facility.project_id if inspection.facility else None
+
+    candidates = []
+    if project_id:
+        candidates = (
+            User.query
+            .join(InspectorAssignment, InspectorAssignment.user_id == User.id)
+            .filter(
+                InspectorAssignment.project_id == project_id,
+                User.role.in_(User.INSPECTOR_ROLES),
+                User.active == True,
+            )
+            .order_by(User.full_name, User.username)
+            .all()
+        )
+
+    if not actor_is_external:
+        candidates += (
+            User.query
+            .filter(
+                User.role.in_(_ORG_WIDE_ASSIGNEE_ROLES),
+                User.active == True,
+            )
+            .order_by(User.full_name, User.username)
+            .all()
+        )
+
+    # The join can repeat a user across assignment rows; dedupe by id, keeping
+    # a stable display order.
+    seen, out = set(), []
+    for u in candidates:
+        if u.id not in seen:
+            seen.add(u.id)
+            out.append(u)
+    out.sort(key=lambda u: (u.display_name or '').lower())
+    return out
+
 @bp.route('/<int:inspection_id>/flag-issue', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
 @login_required
 def flag_issue(inspection_id):
@@ -935,13 +1023,14 @@ def flag_issue(inspection_id):
         return redirect(url_for('inspections.index'))
 
     form  = IssueForm()
-    staff = User.query.filter(
-        User.role.in_(['director', 'inspector', 'external_inspector'])
-    ).order_by(User.username).all()
+    # SAME list the offcanvas rendered — this is what actually validates the
+    # POST, so it is also the security boundary: a crafted assigned_to for
+    # someone outside this contract fails validation rather than being stored.
+    staff = _assignable_staff_for(inspection, current_user)
 
     form.facility_id.choices = [(inspection.facility_id, inspection.facility.name)]
     form.assigned_to.choices = [(0, '— Unassigned —')] + [
-        (u.id, u.username + (' (Customer)' if u.is_external_inspector else ''))
+        (u.id, u.display_name + (' (Customer)' if u.is_external_inspector else ''))
         for u in staff
     ]
 
@@ -1008,6 +1097,21 @@ def flag_issue(inspection_id):
         flash('Issue logged successfully.', 'success')
         return redirect(url_for('inspections.execute', inspection_id=inspection_id))
 
+    # A failed POST must NOT come back 200. The flag-issue offcanvas treats
+    # `res.ok` as success and reloads the page, so a 200 here means the issue
+    # is silently discarded with the user believing it was logged — the exact
+    # failure rule 60 describes. Returning 400 routes it to the JS error branch
+    # so the reason is shown and the form stays open with its input intact.
+    if request.method == 'POST':
+        if form.assigned_to.errors:
+            # Most likely an assignee outside this inspection's contract:
+            # either a stale page rendered before the assignment changed, or a
+            # crafted id. Say something actionable rather than "invalid choice".
+            flash('That person cannot be assigned to an issue on this contract. '
+                  'Reopen the panel to refresh the list.', 'danger')
+        return render_template('inspections/flag_issue.html',
+                               form=form, inspection=inspection), 400
+
     return render_template('inspections/flag_issue.html',
                            form=form, inspection=inspection)