04/18 Enhance app functionalities: master password reset, account deletion/recovery

This commit is contained in:
2026-04-18 14:39:01 -04:00
parent 4d3f9844f0
commit f7fdb9db8a
10 changed files with 1186 additions and 2 deletions
+372
View File
@@ -309,3 +309,375 @@ def mfa_verify():
def mfa_status():
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
return jsonify({'totp_enabled': user.totp_enabled}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/me', methods=['GET'])
@require_jwt
def me():
"""Return basic profile info for the authenticated user."""
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
return jsonify({
'id': user.id,
'email': user.email,
'created_at': user.created_at.isoformat() if user.created_at else None,
'last_login': user.last_login.isoformat() if user.last_login else None,
'totp_enabled': user.totp_enabled,
'recovery_configured': bool(user.recovery_enc_salt),
}), 200
# ── Account management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@auth_bp.route('/change-password', methods=['POST'])
@require_jwt
def change_password():
"""
Change master password — zero-knowledge atomic re-encryption.
The client must:
1. Derive current auth_hash and verify it locally against what it knows.
2. Re-encrypt every vault item with the new vault key client-side.
3. POST the new credentials + all re-encrypted item blobs in one request.
The server verifies the current password, updates master_hash + enc_key_salt,
and bulk-replaces all vault item ciphertexts atomically. If any step fails,
the entire transaction is rolled back — the vault is never left in a split state.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
current_auth_hash = data.get('current_auth_hash', '')
new_auth_hash = data.get('new_auth_hash', '')
new_enc_key_salt = data.get('new_enc_key_salt', '')
items = data.get('items', []) # [{id, enc_data, iv}, ...]
if not current_auth_hash or not new_auth_hash or not new_enc_key_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'current_auth_hash, new_auth_hash, and new_enc_key_salt are required'}), 400
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
if not verify_auth_token(current_auth_hash, user.master_hash):
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.change_password_failed',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Password change rejected — current password incorrect',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Current password is incorrect'}), 401
try:
from app.models.vault_item import VaultItem
# Bulk-update all vault item ciphertexts with new vault key encryption
item_ids = [i.get('id') for i in items if i.get('id')]
existing = {
v.id: v
for v in VaultItem.query.filter(
VaultItem.user_id == user.id,
VaultItem.id.in_(item_ids),
).all()
} if item_ids else {}
for item_data in items:
item_id = item_data.get('id')
enc_data = item_data.get('enc_data', '')
iv = item_data.get('iv', '')
if not item_id or not enc_data or not iv:
continue
vault_item = existing.get(item_id)
if vault_item:
vault_item.enc_data = enc_data
vault_item.iv = iv
# Update credentials
user.master_hash = hash_auth_token(new_auth_hash)
user.enc_key_salt = new_enc_key_salt
# Clear recovery data — it was encrypted with the old vault key and is now invalid
user.recovery_enc_salt = None
user.recovery_iv = None
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.change_password',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail=f'Master password changed; {len(existing)} vault item(s) re-encrypted; recovery code cleared',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
except Exception as e:
db.session.rollback()
return jsonify({'error': f'Password change failed: {str(e)}'}), 500
return jsonify({'message': 'Password changed successfully. Please log in again.'}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/account', methods=['DELETE'])
@require_jwt
def delete_account():
"""
Permanently delete the authenticated user's account and all associated data.
Requires the current auth_hash for confirmation.
Cascading deletes handle vault_items, folders, shared_items, emergency_access.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
auth_hash = data.get('auth_hash', '')
if not auth_hash:
return jsonify({'error': 'auth_hash is required for account deletion'}), 400
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
if not verify_auth_token(auth_hash, user.master_hash):
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.delete_account_failed',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Account deletion rejected — password incorrect',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Incorrect password'}), 401
user_id = user.id
user_email = user.email
try:
# Log before delete (user row will be gone after commit)
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user_id,
action='auth.delete_account',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user_id,
detail=f'Account permanently deleted: {user_email}',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.delete(user)
db.session.commit()
except Exception as e:
db.session.rollback()
return jsonify({'error': f'Account deletion failed: {str(e)}'}), 500
return jsonify({'message': 'Account deleted'}), 200
# ── Account Recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/setup', methods=['POST'])
@require_jwt
def recovery_setup():
"""
Store a recovery-key-encrypted copy of enc_key_salt.
The client generates a random 128-bit recovery code, derives a recovery key
from it (PBKDF2), encrypts enc_key_salt with that key (AES-256-GCM), and
sends the ciphertext + iv. The server stores these blobs — it never sees the
recovery code or enc_key_salt plaintext.
The recovery code is displayed to the user once and never stored server-side.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
recovery_enc_salt = data.get('recovery_enc_salt', '').strip()
recovery_iv = data.get('recovery_iv', '').strip()
if not recovery_enc_salt or not recovery_iv:
return jsonify({'error': 'recovery_enc_salt and recovery_iv are required'}), 400
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
user.recovery_enc_salt = recovery_enc_salt
user.recovery_iv = recovery_iv
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_setup',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Account recovery code configured',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'message': 'Recovery code saved'}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/status', methods=['GET'])
@require_jwt
def recovery_status():
"""Return whether the user has a recovery code configured."""
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
return jsonify({'recovery_configured': bool(user.recovery_enc_salt)}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recover', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit('5 per minute')
def recover_account():
"""
Recover account access using a recovery code.
Flow:
1. Client looks up enc_key_salt and recovery blobs by email.
2. Client decrypts enc_key_salt using the recovery key (derived from the recovery code).
3. Client derives new auth_hash and new vault key with a new master password.
4. Client re-encrypts all vault items with the new vault key.
5. Client POSTs everything here in one atomic payload.
This endpoint is unauthenticated — the recovery code is the credential.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
email = (data.get('email') or '').strip().lower()
new_auth_hash = data.get('new_auth_hash', '')
new_enc_key_salt = data.get('new_enc_key_salt', '')
# Proof that the client successfully decrypted enc_key_salt:
# the client re-derives auth_hash from the *original* enc_key_salt path
# and sends it alongside the new credentials for server-side verification.
recovery_proof = data.get('recovery_proof', '')
items = data.get('items', [])
if not all([email, new_auth_hash, new_enc_key_salt, recovery_proof]):
return jsonify({'error': 'email, new_auth_hash, new_enc_key_salt, and recovery_proof are required'}), 400
time.sleep(0.1) # timing mitigation
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user or not user.recovery_enc_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'No recovery code found for this account'}), 404
# recovery_proof is the enc_key_salt re-encrypted by the client using the
# recovery key — we return it as a blob for the client to verify, then
# the client sends back the decrypted enc_key_salt as recovery_proof.
# Simpler: recovery_proof = HMAC or simply the decrypted enc_key_salt itself,
# which the client proves by sending it back plaintext. The server checks it
# matches user.enc_key_salt — if the recovery code was wrong, decryption
# would produce garbage that won't match.
if recovery_proof != user.enc_key_salt:
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_failed',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Recovery attempt failed — incorrect recovery code',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid recovery code'}), 401
try:
from app.models.vault_item import VaultItem
item_ids = [i.get('id') for i in items if i.get('id')]
existing = {
v.id: v
for v in VaultItem.query.filter(
VaultItem.user_id == user.id,
VaultItem.id.in_(item_ids),
).all()
} if item_ids else {}
for item_data in items:
item_id = item_data.get('id')
enc_data = item_data.get('enc_data', '')
iv = item_data.get('iv', '')
if not item_id or not enc_data or not iv:
continue
vault_item = existing.get(item_id)
if vault_item:
vault_item.enc_data = enc_data
vault_item.iv = iv
user.master_hash = hash_auth_token(new_auth_hash)
user.enc_key_salt = new_enc_key_salt
# Recovery code is consumed — clear it so it cannot be reused
user.recovery_enc_salt = None
user.recovery_iv = None
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_success',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail=f'Account recovered; {len(existing)} vault item(s) re-encrypted; recovery code consumed',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
except Exception as e:
db.session.rollback()
return jsonify({'error': f'Recovery failed: {str(e)}'}), 500
tokens = generate_tokens(user.id)
return jsonify({
'message': 'Account recovered successfully',
'access_token': tokens['access_token'],
'refresh_token': tokens['refresh_token'],
'enc_key_salt': user.enc_key_salt,
}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/data', methods=['GET'])
@limiter.limit('10 per minute')
def recovery_data():
"""
Return the data the client needs to attempt recovery (unauthenticated).
Exposes only: enc_key_salt, recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv.
Returns 404 if no recovery code is configured (prevents user enumeration
of which accounts have recovery set up — same response for unknown email).
"""
email = (request.args.get('email') or '').strip().lower()
if not email:
return jsonify({'error': 'email is required'}), 400
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user or not user.recovery_enc_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'No recovery data found'}), 404
return jsonify({
'enc_key_salt': user.enc_key_salt,
'recovery_enc_salt': user.recovery_enc_salt,
'recovery_iv': user.recovery_iv,
}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/items', methods=['GET'])
@limiter.limit('10 per minute')
def recovery_items():
"""
Return encrypted vault items for recovery re-encryption (unauthenticated).
Requires X-Recovery-Proof header containing the plaintext enc_key_salt.
The server verifies it matches user.enc_key_salt — proof that the client
correctly decrypted the recovery blob (i.e. has the correct recovery code).
Items are returned as encrypted ciphertext blobs only — no sensitive
plaintext is exposed. The client re-encrypts them locally.
"""
email = (request.args.get('email') or '').strip().lower()
recovery_proof = request.headers.get('X-Recovery-Proof', '').strip()
if not email or not recovery_proof:
return jsonify({'error': 'email and X-Recovery-Proof header are required'}), 400
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user or not user.recovery_enc_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'No recovery data found'}), 404
if recovery_proof != user.enc_key_salt:
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_items_denied',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Recovery items request denied — incorrect recovery proof',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid recovery proof'}), 401
from app.models.vault_item import VaultItem
items = VaultItem.query.filter_by(user_id=user.id).all()
return jsonify({
'items': [
{'id': item.id, 'enc_data': item.enc_data, 'iv': item.iv}
for item in items
]
}), 200