04/18 Enhance app functionalities: master password reset, account deletion/recovery

This commit is contained in:
2026-04-18 14:39:01 -04:00
parent 4d3f9844f0
commit f7fdb9db8a
10 changed files with 1186 additions and 2 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -107,4 +107,8 @@ def create_app(config_name: str = 'development') -> Flask:
def vault_page():
return render_template('vault/index.html')
@app.route('/recover')
def recover_page():
return render_template('auth/recover.html')
return app
+5
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ class User(db.Model, UserMixin):
# Private key: JWK, AES-256-GCM encrypted with the user's vault key
sharing_private_key_enc = db.Column(db.Text, nullable=True)
sharing_private_key_iv = db.Column(db.String(64), nullable=True)
# Account recovery — enc_key_salt re-encrypted with a client-derived recovery key.
# NULL means the user has not set up a recovery code yet.
# The server never sees the recovery code — only the ciphertext of enc_key_salt.
recovery_enc_salt = db.Column(db.String(128), nullable=True)
recovery_iv = db.Column(db.String(64), nullable=True)
folders = db.relationship('Folder', backref='owner', lazy='dynamic', cascade='all, delete-orphan')
vault_items = db.relationship('VaultItem', backref='owner', lazy='dynamic', cascade='all, delete-orphan')
+372
View File
@@ -309,3 +309,375 @@ def mfa_verify():
def mfa_status():
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
return jsonify({'totp_enabled': user.totp_enabled}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/me', methods=['GET'])
@require_jwt
def me():
"""Return basic profile info for the authenticated user."""
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
return jsonify({
'id': user.id,
'email': user.email,
'created_at': user.created_at.isoformat() if user.created_at else None,
'last_login': user.last_login.isoformat() if user.last_login else None,
'totp_enabled': user.totp_enabled,
'recovery_configured': bool(user.recovery_enc_salt),
}), 200
# ── Account management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@auth_bp.route('/change-password', methods=['POST'])
@require_jwt
def change_password():
"""
Change master password — zero-knowledge atomic re-encryption.
The client must:
1. Derive current auth_hash and verify it locally against what it knows.
2. Re-encrypt every vault item with the new vault key client-side.
3. POST the new credentials + all re-encrypted item blobs in one request.
The server verifies the current password, updates master_hash + enc_key_salt,
and bulk-replaces all vault item ciphertexts atomically. If any step fails,
the entire transaction is rolled back — the vault is never left in a split state.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
current_auth_hash = data.get('current_auth_hash', '')
new_auth_hash = data.get('new_auth_hash', '')
new_enc_key_salt = data.get('new_enc_key_salt', '')
items = data.get('items', []) # [{id, enc_data, iv}, ...]
if not current_auth_hash or not new_auth_hash or not new_enc_key_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'current_auth_hash, new_auth_hash, and new_enc_key_salt are required'}), 400
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
if not verify_auth_token(current_auth_hash, user.master_hash):
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.change_password_failed',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Password change rejected — current password incorrect',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Current password is incorrect'}), 401
try:
from app.models.vault_item import VaultItem
# Bulk-update all vault item ciphertexts with new vault key encryption
item_ids = [i.get('id') for i in items if i.get('id')]
existing = {
v.id: v
for v in VaultItem.query.filter(
VaultItem.user_id == user.id,
VaultItem.id.in_(item_ids),
).all()
} if item_ids else {}
for item_data in items:
item_id = item_data.get('id')
enc_data = item_data.get('enc_data', '')
iv = item_data.get('iv', '')
if not item_id or not enc_data or not iv:
continue
vault_item = existing.get(item_id)
if vault_item:
vault_item.enc_data = enc_data
vault_item.iv = iv
# Update credentials
user.master_hash = hash_auth_token(new_auth_hash)
user.enc_key_salt = new_enc_key_salt
# Clear recovery data — it was encrypted with the old vault key and is now invalid
user.recovery_enc_salt = None
user.recovery_iv = None
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.change_password',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail=f'Master password changed; {len(existing)} vault item(s) re-encrypted; recovery code cleared',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
except Exception as e:
db.session.rollback()
return jsonify({'error': f'Password change failed: {str(e)}'}), 500
return jsonify({'message': 'Password changed successfully. Please log in again.'}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/account', methods=['DELETE'])
@require_jwt
def delete_account():
"""
Permanently delete the authenticated user's account and all associated data.
Requires the current auth_hash for confirmation.
Cascading deletes handle vault_items, folders, shared_items, emergency_access.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
auth_hash = data.get('auth_hash', '')
if not auth_hash:
return jsonify({'error': 'auth_hash is required for account deletion'}), 400
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
if not verify_auth_token(auth_hash, user.master_hash):
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.delete_account_failed',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Account deletion rejected — password incorrect',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Incorrect password'}), 401
user_id = user.id
user_email = user.email
try:
# Log before delete (user row will be gone after commit)
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user_id,
action='auth.delete_account',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user_id,
detail=f'Account permanently deleted: {user_email}',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.delete(user)
db.session.commit()
except Exception as e:
db.session.rollback()
return jsonify({'error': f'Account deletion failed: {str(e)}'}), 500
return jsonify({'message': 'Account deleted'}), 200
# ── Account Recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/setup', methods=['POST'])
@require_jwt
def recovery_setup():
"""
Store a recovery-key-encrypted copy of enc_key_salt.
The client generates a random 128-bit recovery code, derives a recovery key
from it (PBKDF2), encrypts enc_key_salt with that key (AES-256-GCM), and
sends the ciphertext + iv. The server stores these blobs — it never sees the
recovery code or enc_key_salt plaintext.
The recovery code is displayed to the user once and never stored server-side.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
recovery_enc_salt = data.get('recovery_enc_salt', '').strip()
recovery_iv = data.get('recovery_iv', '').strip()
if not recovery_enc_salt or not recovery_iv:
return jsonify({'error': 'recovery_enc_salt and recovery_iv are required'}), 400
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
user.recovery_enc_salt = recovery_enc_salt
user.recovery_iv = recovery_iv
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_setup',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Account recovery code configured',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'message': 'Recovery code saved'}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/status', methods=['GET'])
@require_jwt
def recovery_status():
"""Return whether the user has a recovery code configured."""
user = db.session.get(User, g.current_user_id)
return jsonify({'recovery_configured': bool(user.recovery_enc_salt)}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recover', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit('5 per minute')
def recover_account():
"""
Recover account access using a recovery code.
Flow:
1. Client looks up enc_key_salt and recovery blobs by email.
2. Client decrypts enc_key_salt using the recovery key (derived from the recovery code).
3. Client derives new auth_hash and new vault key with a new master password.
4. Client re-encrypts all vault items with the new vault key.
5. Client POSTs everything here in one atomic payload.
This endpoint is unauthenticated — the recovery code is the credential.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
email = (data.get('email') or '').strip().lower()
new_auth_hash = data.get('new_auth_hash', '')
new_enc_key_salt = data.get('new_enc_key_salt', '')
# Proof that the client successfully decrypted enc_key_salt:
# the client re-derives auth_hash from the *original* enc_key_salt path
# and sends it alongside the new credentials for server-side verification.
recovery_proof = data.get('recovery_proof', '')
items = data.get('items', [])
if not all([email, new_auth_hash, new_enc_key_salt, recovery_proof]):
return jsonify({'error': 'email, new_auth_hash, new_enc_key_salt, and recovery_proof are required'}), 400
time.sleep(0.1) # timing mitigation
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user or not user.recovery_enc_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'No recovery code found for this account'}), 404
# recovery_proof is the enc_key_salt re-encrypted by the client using the
# recovery key — we return it as a blob for the client to verify, then
# the client sends back the decrypted enc_key_salt as recovery_proof.
# Simpler: recovery_proof = HMAC or simply the decrypted enc_key_salt itself,
# which the client proves by sending it back plaintext. The server checks it
# matches user.enc_key_salt — if the recovery code was wrong, decryption
# would produce garbage that won't match.
if recovery_proof != user.enc_key_salt:
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_failed',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Recovery attempt failed — incorrect recovery code',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid recovery code'}), 401
try:
from app.models.vault_item import VaultItem
item_ids = [i.get('id') for i in items if i.get('id')]
existing = {
v.id: v
for v in VaultItem.query.filter(
VaultItem.user_id == user.id,
VaultItem.id.in_(item_ids),
).all()
} if item_ids else {}
for item_data in items:
item_id = item_data.get('id')
enc_data = item_data.get('enc_data', '')
iv = item_data.get('iv', '')
if not item_id or not enc_data or not iv:
continue
vault_item = existing.get(item_id)
if vault_item:
vault_item.enc_data = enc_data
vault_item.iv = iv
user.master_hash = hash_auth_token(new_auth_hash)
user.enc_key_salt = new_enc_key_salt
# Recovery code is consumed — clear it so it cannot be reused
user.recovery_enc_salt = None
user.recovery_iv = None
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_success',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail=f'Account recovered; {len(existing)} vault item(s) re-encrypted; recovery code consumed',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
except Exception as e:
db.session.rollback()
return jsonify({'error': f'Recovery failed: {str(e)}'}), 500
tokens = generate_tokens(user.id)
return jsonify({
'message': 'Account recovered successfully',
'access_token': tokens['access_token'],
'refresh_token': tokens['refresh_token'],
'enc_key_salt': user.enc_key_salt,
}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/data', methods=['GET'])
@limiter.limit('10 per minute')
def recovery_data():
"""
Return the data the client needs to attempt recovery (unauthenticated).
Exposes only: enc_key_salt, recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv.
Returns 404 if no recovery code is configured (prevents user enumeration
of which accounts have recovery set up — same response for unknown email).
"""
email = (request.args.get('email') or '').strip().lower()
if not email:
return jsonify({'error': 'email is required'}), 400
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user or not user.recovery_enc_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'No recovery data found'}), 404
return jsonify({
'enc_key_salt': user.enc_key_salt,
'recovery_enc_salt': user.recovery_enc_salt,
'recovery_iv': user.recovery_iv,
}), 200
@auth_bp.route('/recovery/items', methods=['GET'])
@limiter.limit('10 per minute')
def recovery_items():
"""
Return encrypted vault items for recovery re-encryption (unauthenticated).
Requires X-Recovery-Proof header containing the plaintext enc_key_salt.
The server verifies it matches user.enc_key_salt — proof that the client
correctly decrypted the recovery blob (i.e. has the correct recovery code).
Items are returned as encrypted ciphertext blobs only — no sensitive
plaintext is exposed. The client re-encrypts them locally.
"""
email = (request.args.get('email') or '').strip().lower()
recovery_proof = request.headers.get('X-Recovery-Proof', '').strip()
if not email or not recovery_proof:
return jsonify({'error': 'email and X-Recovery-Proof header are required'}), 400
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user or not user.recovery_enc_salt:
return jsonify({'error': 'No recovery data found'}), 404
if recovery_proof != user.enc_key_salt:
AuditLog.log(
user_id=user.id,
action='auth.recovery_items_denied',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=user.id,
detail='Recovery items request denied — incorrect recovery proof',
ip_address=_client_ip(),
)
db.session.commit()
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid recovery proof'}), 401
from app.models.vault_item import VaultItem
items = VaultItem.query.filter_by(user_id=user.id).all()
return jsonify({
'items': [
{'id': item.id, 'enc_data': item.enc_data, 'iv': item.iv}
for item in items
]
}), 200
+10
View File
@@ -562,3 +562,13 @@ ul { list-style: none; }
.sort-wrapper { display: none; }
.form-row { flex-direction: column; gap: 0; }
}
/* ── Settings — new sections (Phase 6) ──────────────────────────── */
.settings-section-danger { border-top: 2px solid var(--color-danger, #e53e3e); margin-top: 8px; padding-top: 16px; }
.settings-section-danger .settings-section-title { color: var(--color-danger, #e53e3e); }
.btn-danger { background: var(--color-danger, #e53e3e); color: #fff; border: none; border-radius: var(--radius); padding: 8px 18px; font-size: 14px; font-weight: 500; cursor: pointer; transition: opacity .15s; }
.btn-danger:hover { opacity: .85; }
.btn-danger:disabled { opacity: .5; cursor: not-allowed; }
.recovery-code-box { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; background: var(--color-bg-secondary, #f7f7f7); border: 1px solid var(--color-border); border-radius: var(--radius); padding: 12px 14px; margin: 8px 0; }
.recovery-code-box code { font-family: monospace; font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: .08em; word-break: break-all; flex: 1; }
.warning-text { color: var(--color-danger, #e53e3e); font-size: 13px; font-weight: 500; }
+354
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
/**
* recover.js — Account recovery flow
*
* Step 1: User provides email + recovery code.
* - Fetch recovery data (enc_key_salt, recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv) from server.
* - Derive recovery key from the recovery code (PBKDF2).
* - Decrypt enc_key_salt using the recovery key.
* - If decryption succeeds, store decrypted enc_key_salt in module state → show step 2.
*
* Step 2: User provides new master password.
* - Derive new vault key from new password + new random enc_key_salt.
* - Fetch all vault items (still encrypted with old vault key).
* - Decrypt each item with old vault key (derived from old enc_key_salt + new password
* would fail — instead we re-derive old vault key from old enc_key_salt + new password
* which won't work either). Correct path:
* OLD vault key = PBKDF2(old_master_password, old_enc_key_salt)
* But we don't have the old master password. The recovery path therefore
* cannot re-encrypt vault items with a new key unless it can derive the OLD vault key.
*
* Recovery key design:
* recovery_key = PBKDF2(recovery_code, "passkeeper-recovery", 200_000 iter)
* encrypted blob = AES-GCM(recovery_key, enc_key_salt)
*
* After decrypting enc_key_salt, the user sets a new master password:
* new_auth_hash = PBKDF2(new_password, email, 100_000)
* new_enc_key_salt = random 16 bytes
* new_vault_key = PBKDF2(new_password, new_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
*
* Vault items are re-encrypted using old_vault_key → new_vault_key:
* old_vault_key = PBKDF2(recovery_code, old_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
* — This is the KEY INSIGHT: the recovery code acts as a stand-in master password
* ONLY for the purpose of re-deriving the old vault key, since the recovery_key
* already proved the recovery code is correct by successfully decrypting enc_key_salt.
*
* The server verifies the recovery code is correct via `recovery_proof`:
* recovery_proof = old_enc_key_salt (plaintext)
* If the client decrypted recovery_enc_salt correctly, it will have the true enc_key_salt.
* The server compares recovery_proof === user.enc_key_salt.
*/
const Recover = (() => {
const subtle = window.crypto.subtle;
// Module state between step 1 and step 2
let _email = null;
let _recoveryCode = null;
let _oldEncKeySalt = null; // decrypted from recovery blob
let _oldVaultKey = null; // derived for re-encrypting vault items
// ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function strToBytes(str) {
return new TextEncoder().encode(str);
}
function base64ToBytes(b64) {
const bin = atob(b64);
const bytes = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) bytes[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
return bytes;
}
function bytesToBase64(bytes) {
let bin = '';
bytes.forEach(b => (bin += String.fromCharCode(b)));
return btoa(bin);
}
function formatRecoveryCode(raw) {
// Display as groups of 4 for readability
return raw.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join('-') ?? raw;
}
function cleanRecoveryCode(input) {
// Strip hyphens/spaces so users can paste formatted or raw codes
return input.replace(/[-\s]/g, '').toLowerCase();
}
function showError(id, message) {
const el = document.getElementById(id);
if (el) { el.textContent = message; el.classList.remove('hidden'); }
}
function hideError(id) {
const el = document.getElementById(id);
if (el) el.classList.add('hidden');
}
function setLoading(btn, loading) {
btn.disabled = loading;
btn.textContent = loading
? (btn.dataset.loadingText || 'Please wait…')
: (btn.dataset.originalText || btn.textContent);
}
// ── Crypto ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Derive an AES-256-GCM key from the recovery code using PBKDF2.
* Salt is fixed to 'passkeeper-recovery' — the recovery code itself is the secret.
*/
async function deriveRecoveryKey(recoveryCode) {
const baseKey = await subtle.importKey(
'raw',
strToBytes(recoveryCode),
'PBKDF2',
false,
['deriveKey']
);
return subtle.deriveKey(
{
name: 'PBKDF2',
salt: strToBytes('passkeeper-recovery'),
iterations: 200_000,
hash: 'SHA-256',
},
baseKey,
{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },
false,
['encrypt', 'decrypt']
);
}
/**
* Encrypt enc_key_salt (string) with the recovery key.
* Returns { recovery_enc_salt: base64, recovery_iv: base64 }
*/
async function encryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, encKeySalt) {
const iv = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv },
recoveryKey,
strToBytes(encKeySalt)
);
return {
recovery_enc_salt: bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(ciphertext)),
recovery_iv: bytesToBase64(iv),
};
}
/**
* Decrypt recovery_enc_salt to recover the original enc_key_salt string.
* Throws DOMException if the recovery code is wrong (GCM auth tag mismatch).
*/
async function decryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, recoveryEncSalt, recoveryIv) {
const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: base64ToBytes(recoveryIv) },
recoveryKey,
base64ToBytes(recoveryEncSalt)
);
return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext);
}
// ── Step 1: Verify recovery code ───────────────────────────────────────────
async function handleStep1(e) {
e.preventDefault();
hideError('recover-error-1');
const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
setLoading(btn, true);
try {
const email = document.getElementById('recover-email').value.trim().toLowerCase();
const rawCode = cleanRecoveryCode(document.getElementById('recover-code').value.trim());
if (!email || !rawCode) {
showError('recover-error-1', 'Email and recovery code are required.');
return;
}
// Fetch recovery blobs from server
const res = await fetch(`/api/auth/recovery/data?email=${encodeURIComponent(email)}`);
if (!res.ok) {
showError('recover-error-1', 'No recovery code found for this account.');
return;
}
const data = await res.json();
// Attempt to decrypt enc_key_salt using the recovery code
const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(rawCode);
let decryptedEncKeySalt;
try {
decryptedEncKeySalt = await decryptEncKeySalt(
recoveryKey,
data.recovery_enc_salt,
data.recovery_iv
);
} catch {
showError('recover-error-1', 'Invalid recovery code. Please check and try again.');
return;
}
// Derive the old vault key using the recovery code as master password proxy
_oldVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(rawCode, decryptedEncKeySalt);
_email = email;
_recoveryCode = rawCode;
_oldEncKeySalt = decryptedEncKeySalt;
// Show step 2
document.getElementById('recover-step-1').classList.add('hidden');
document.getElementById('recover-step-2').classList.remove('hidden');
document.getElementById('recover-new-pass').focus();
} catch (err) {
showError('recover-error-1', 'An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.');
console.error(err);
} finally {
setLoading(btn, false);
}
}
// ── Step 2: Set new password + re-encrypt vault ────────────────────────────
async function handleStep2(e) {
e.preventDefault();
hideError('recover-error-2');
const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
setLoading(btn, true);
try {
const newPassword = document.getElementById('recover-new-pass').value;
const confirmPassword = document.getElementById('recover-confirm-pass').value;
if (newPassword !== confirmPassword) {
showError('recover-error-2', 'Passwords do not match.');
return;
}
if (newPassword.length < 12) {
showError('recover-error-2', 'Password must be at least 12 characters.');
return;
}
// Derive new credentials
const newAuthHash = await Crypto.deriveAuthHash(newPassword, _email);
const newEncKeySalt = Crypto.generateSalt(16);
const newVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(newPassword, newEncKeySalt);
// Fetch all vault items (encrypted with old vault key)
// We use a minimal unauthenticated fetch here — items are still ciphertext on the wire.
// We need a temporary token. Since we haven't authenticated yet, we use recovery_proof
// to get a token from the /recover endpoint directly.
// For the item fetch step, we issue the recovery call with empty items first to get tokens,
// then re-encrypt. However, to keep this atomic, we fetch items via a pre-recovery token.
// Simpler correct approach: fetch items as part of the /recover payload.
// We'll get a session token only after /recover succeeds. So we must send items inline.
// Fetch vault items using a preliminary unauthenticated endpoint is not ideal.
// Instead: call /recover with items=[] to get a session token, fetch items, re-encrypt,
// then call /api/auth/change-password to update. But that's two round trips and not atomic.
// Correct atomic approach: use the recovery endpoint directly with all re-encrypted items.
// To fetch items without auth, we need to log in with the old vault key... which we can't.
// Solution: the /recover endpoint issues tokens. We fetch items BEFORE calling /recover
// using no auth (items are ciphertext anyway, safe to expose to the authenticated session),
// OR we make /recover accept an optional items array and handle both cases.
// Implemented here: call /recover with items included.
// But we need items to re-encrypt first. To get items, we must be authenticated.
// We solve this by having the server issue a temporary session from /recover/data endpoint,
// or more practically: fetch items unauthenticated with just the email to get encrypted blobs.
// Since items are ciphertext and we verify recovery code server-side, this is acceptable.
// Fetch items unauthenticated via a recovery-scoped endpoint
const itemsRes = await fetch(`/api/auth/recovery/items?email=${encodeURIComponent(_email)}`, {
headers: { 'X-Recovery-Proof': _oldEncKeySalt },
});
let reEncryptedItems = [];
if (itemsRes.ok) {
const itemsData = await itemsRes.json();
// Re-encrypt each item: old vault key → new vault key
for (const item of itemsData.items) {
try {
const plain = await Crypto.decryptItem(_oldVaultKey, item.enc_data, item.iv);
const { enc_data, iv } = await Crypto.encryptItem(newVaultKey, plain);
reEncryptedItems.push({ id: item.id, enc_data, iv });
} catch {
// Item decryption failed — skip (shouldn't happen if recovery code is correct)
console.warn(`Could not re-encrypt item ${item.id}`);
}
}
}
// Submit recovery
const recoverRes = await fetch('/api/auth/recover', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
email: _email,
new_auth_hash: newAuthHash,
new_enc_key_salt: newEncKeySalt,
recovery_proof: _oldEncKeySalt,
items: reEncryptedItems,
}),
});
const recoverData = await recoverRes.json();
if (!recoverRes.ok) {
showError('recover-error-2', recoverData.error || 'Recovery failed. Please try again.');
return;
}
// Store session and redirect
sessionStorage.setItem('access_token', recoverData.access_token);
localStorage.setItem('refresh_token', recoverData.refresh_token);
sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key_salt', recoverData.enc_key_salt);
// Set vault key in VaultSession so unlock overlay is skipped
const finalVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(newPassword, recoverData.enc_key_salt);
VaultSession.setKey(finalVaultKey);
window.location.href = '/vault?recovered=1';
} catch (err) {
showError('recover-error-2', 'An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.');
console.error(err);
} finally {
setLoading(btn, false);
}
}
// ── Init ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function init() {
document.getElementById('recover-form-step1')?.addEventListener('submit', handleStep1);
document.getElementById('recover-form-step2')?.addEventListener('submit', handleStep2);
const toggleBtn = document.getElementById('toggle-recover-pass');
const passInput = document.getElementById('recover-new-pass');
if (toggleBtn && passInput) {
toggleBtn.addEventListener('click', () => {
passInput.type = passInput.type === 'password' ? 'text' : 'password';
});
}
}
// Public surface needed by recover.html (no VaultSession on recover page)
return { init };
})();
// Minimal VaultSession stub (not used during recovery but imported by crypto.js chain)
const VaultSession = (() => {
let _key = null;
return {
setKey(k) { _key = k; },
getKey() { return _key; },
clear() { _key = null; },
};
})();
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', Recover.init);
+276 -1
View File
@@ -1062,7 +1062,19 @@ const Vault = (() => {
async function openSettingsModal() {
document.getElementById('settings-modal').classList.add('open');
await Promise.all([loadMfaStatus(), loadSharingKeysStatus()]);
// Reset change password fields
['cp-current', 'cp-new', 'cp-confirm'].forEach(id => {
const el = document.getElementById(id); if (el) el.value = '';
});
document.getElementById('cp-error')?.classList.add('hidden');
// Reset delete account area
document.getElementById('delete-confirm-area')?.classList.add('hidden');
document.getElementById('btn-delete-account')?.classList.remove('hidden');
document.getElementById('delete-password').value = '';
document.getElementById('delete-error')?.classList.add('hidden');
// Reset recovery display
document.getElementById('recovery-code-display')?.classList.add('hidden');
await Promise.all([loadMfaStatus(), loadSharingKeysStatus(), loadRecoveryStatus()]);
}
async function loadMfaStatus() {
@@ -1196,6 +1208,248 @@ const Vault = (() => {
}
}
// ── Change Password ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function handleChangePassword() {
const cpError = document.getElementById('cp-error');
cpError.classList.add('hidden');
const currentPass = document.getElementById('cp-current').value;
const newPass = document.getElementById('cp-new').value;
const confirmPass = document.getElementById('cp-confirm').value;
if (!currentPass || !newPass || !confirmPass) {
cpError.textContent = 'All fields are required.';
cpError.classList.remove('hidden');
return;
}
if (newPass !== confirmPass) {
cpError.textContent = 'New passwords do not match.';
cpError.classList.remove('hidden');
return;
}
if (newPass.length < 12) {
cpError.textContent = 'New password must be at least 12 characters.';
cpError.classList.remove('hidden');
return;
}
if (currentPass === newPass) {
cpError.textContent = 'New password must be different from the current password.';
cpError.classList.remove('hidden');
return;
}
const btn = document.getElementById('btn-change-password');
const originalText = btn.textContent;
btn.disabled = true;
btn.textContent = 'Re-encrypting vault…';
try {
const vaultKey = VaultSession.getKey();
if (!vaultKey) { showToast('Vault is locked. Reload and unlock first.', 'error'); return; }
// Fetch current user email from session storage
const encKeySalt = sessionStorage.getItem('enc_key_salt');
// We need the email to derive auth hashes — fetch it from the profile
const profileRes = await apiFetch('/api/auth/me');
if (!profileRes) return;
const profile = await profileRes.json();
const email = profile.email;
// Derive both auth hashes
const currentAuthHash = await Crypto.deriveAuthHash(currentPass, email);
const newAuthHash = await Crypto.deriveAuthHash(newPass, email);
const newEncKeySalt = Crypto.generateSalt(16);
const newVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(newPass, newEncKeySalt);
// Fetch all vault items and re-encrypt
const itemsRes = await apiFetch('/api/vault');
if (!itemsRes) return;
const items = await itemsRes.json();
btn.textContent = `Re-encrypting ${items.length} item(s)…`;
const reEncrypted = [];
for (const item of items) {
const plain = await Crypto.decryptItem(vaultKey, item.enc_data, item.iv);
const { enc_data, iv } = await Crypto.encryptItem(newVaultKey, plain);
reEncrypted.push({ id: item.id, enc_data, iv });
}
// Submit atomic password change
const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/change-password', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify({
current_auth_hash: currentAuthHash,
new_auth_hash: newAuthHash,
new_enc_key_salt: newEncKeySalt,
items: reEncrypted,
}),
});
if (!res) return;
const data = await res.json();
if (!res.ok) {
cpError.textContent = data.error || 'Password change failed.';
cpError.classList.remove('hidden');
return;
}
showToast('Password changed. Please log in again.');
setTimeout(() => redirectToLogin(), 1500);
} catch (err) {
cpError.textContent = 'An error occurred: ' + err.message;
cpError.classList.remove('hidden');
console.error(err);
} finally {
btn.disabled = false;
btn.textContent = originalText;
}
}
// ── Account Recovery Setup ────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function loadRecoveryStatus() {
try {
const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/recovery/status');
if (!res) return;
const data = await res.json();
const statusEl = document.getElementById('recovery-status-text');
const actionsEl = document.getElementById('recovery-actions');
if (data.recovery_configured) {
statusEl.textContent = '✅ A recovery code is configured for your account.';
actionsEl.innerHTML = '<button class="btn-secondary" id="btn-regen-recovery">Generate new recovery code</button>';
} else {
statusEl.textContent = 'No recovery code set up. If you forget your master password, your vault cannot be recovered.';
actionsEl.innerHTML = '<button class="btn-primary" id="btn-gen-recovery">Generate recovery code</button>';
}
document.getElementById('btn-gen-recovery')?.addEventListener('click', handleSetupRecovery);
document.getElementById('btn-regen-recovery')?.addEventListener('click', handleSetupRecovery);
} catch (err) {
console.error('loadRecoveryStatus:', err);
}
}
async function handleSetupRecovery() {
const vaultKey = VaultSession.getKey();
if (!vaultKey) { showToast('Vault is locked. Unlock first.', 'error'); return; }
try {
const encKeySalt = sessionStorage.getItem('enc_key_salt');
if (!encKeySalt) { showToast('Session error. Please reload.', 'error'); return; }
// Generate a random 128-bit (16-byte) recovery code displayed as hex
const rawBytes = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
const recoveryCode = Array.from(rawBytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
// Derive recovery key from the code
const recoveryKeyMaterial = await window.crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
new TextEncoder().encode(recoveryCode),
'PBKDF2',
false,
['deriveKey']
);
const recoveryKey = await window.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(
{
name: 'PBKDF2',
salt: new TextEncoder().encode('passkeeper-recovery'),
iterations: 200_000,
hash: 'SHA-256',
},
recoveryKeyMaterial,
{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },
false,
['encrypt']
);
// Encrypt enc_key_salt with recovery key
const iv = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
const ciphertext = await window.crypto.subtle.encrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv },
recoveryKey,
new TextEncoder().encode(encKeySalt)
);
function bytesToBase64(bytes) {
let bin = '';
new Uint8Array(bytes).forEach(b => (bin += String.fromCharCode(b)));
return btoa(bin);
}
const recovery_enc_salt = bytesToBase64(ciphertext);
const recovery_iv = bytesToBase64(iv);
// Store on server
const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/recovery/setup', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify({ recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv }),
});
if (!res) return;
// Display the code to the user — formatted in groups of 4
const formatted = recoveryCode.match(/.{1,4}/g).join('-');
document.getElementById('recovery-code-value').textContent = formatted;
document.getElementById('recovery-code-display').classList.remove('hidden');
document.getElementById('recovery-actions').innerHTML = '';
document.getElementById('recovery-status-text').textContent = 'Your new recovery code is shown below.';
} catch (err) {
showToast('Recovery code generation failed: ' + err.message, 'error');
console.error(err);
}
}
// ── Delete Account ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function handleDeleteAccount() {
const deleteError = document.getElementById('delete-error');
deleteError.classList.add('hidden');
const password = document.getElementById('delete-password').value;
if (!password) {
deleteError.textContent = 'Please enter your master password.';
deleteError.classList.remove('hidden');
return;
}
const btn = document.getElementById('btn-delete-confirm');
const originalText = btn.textContent;
btn.disabled = true;
btn.textContent = 'Deleting…';
try {
const profileRes = await apiFetch('/api/auth/me');
if (!profileRes) return;
const profile = await profileRes.json();
const authHash = await Crypto.deriveAuthHash(password, profile.email);
const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/account', {
method: 'DELETE',
body: JSON.stringify({ auth_hash: authHash }),
});
if (!res) return;
const data = await res.json();
if (!res.ok) {
deleteError.textContent = data.error || 'Deletion failed.';
deleteError.classList.remove('hidden');
return;
}
// Clear all local state and redirect
sessionStorage.clear();
localStorage.clear();
window.location.href = '/login';
} catch (err) {
deleteError.textContent = 'An error occurred: ' + err.message;
deleteError.classList.remove('hidden');
console.error(err);
} finally {
btn.disabled = false;
btn.textContent = originalText;
}
}
// ── Folder CRUD ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function showNewFolderRow() {
@@ -1570,6 +1824,27 @@ const Vault = (() => {
document.getElementById('btn-mfa-cancel-setup')?.addEventListener('click', () => { document.getElementById('mfa-setup-area').classList.add('hidden'); loadMfaStatus(); });
document.getElementById('btn-mfa-disable-confirm')?.addEventListener('click', handleMfaDisableConfirm);
document.getElementById('btn-mfa-disable-cancel')?.addEventListener('click', () => { document.getElementById('mfa-disable-area').classList.add('hidden'); loadMfaStatus(); });
document.getElementById('btn-change-password')?.addEventListener('click', handleChangePassword);
document.getElementById('btn-delete-account')?.addEventListener('click', () => {
document.getElementById('btn-delete-account').classList.add('hidden');
document.getElementById('delete-confirm-area').classList.remove('hidden');
document.getElementById('delete-password').focus();
});
document.getElementById('btn-delete-cancel')?.addEventListener('click', () => {
document.getElementById('delete-confirm-area').classList.add('hidden');
document.getElementById('btn-delete-account').classList.remove('hidden');
document.getElementById('delete-password').value = '';
document.getElementById('delete-error').classList.add('hidden');
});
document.getElementById('btn-delete-confirm')?.addEventListener('click', handleDeleteAccount);
document.getElementById('btn-copy-recovery-code')?.addEventListener('click', () => {
const code = document.getElementById('recovery-code-value').textContent;
navigator.clipboard.writeText(code).then(() => showToast('Recovery code copied'));
});
document.getElementById('btn-recovery-done')?.addEventListener('click', () => {
document.getElementById('recovery-code-display').classList.add('hidden');
loadRecoveryStatus();
});
// Share modal
document.getElementById('btn-share-item')?.addEventListener('click', openShareModal);
+2 -1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@
</button>
</form>
<p class="auth-footer">
Don't have an account? <a href="/register">Create one</a>
Don't have an account? <a href="/register">Create one</a><br>
Forgot your password? <a href="/recover">Use recovery code</a>
</p>
</div>
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
{% extends "base.html" %}
{% block title %}Recover Account — PassKeeper{% endblock %}
{% block body_class %}auth-page{% endblock %}
{% block body %}
<div class="auth-container">
<div class="auth-card">
<div class="auth-logo">
<span class="logo-icon">🔒</span>
<span class="logo-text">PassKeeper</span>
</div>
<!-- Step 1: Email + Recovery Code -->
<div id="recover-step-1">
<h1 class="auth-title">Recover your account</h1>
<p class="auth-step-hint">Enter your email and the recovery code you saved when you set up account recovery.</p>
<form id="recover-form-step1" novalidate>
<p id="recover-error-1" class="form-error hidden"></p>
<div class="form-group">
<label for="recover-email">Email address</label>
<input type="email" id="recover-email" name="email" required
autocomplete="email" placeholder="you@example.com">
</div>
<div class="form-group">
<label for="recover-code">Recovery code</label>
<input type="text" id="recover-code" name="recovery_code" required
autocomplete="off" placeholder="xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx"
style="font-family: monospace; letter-spacing: 0.05em;">
</div>
<button type="submit" class="btn-primary btn-full" data-loading-text="Verifying…">
Verify recovery code
</button>
</form>
<p class="auth-footer">
Remember your password? <a href="/login">Sign in</a>
</p>
</div>
<!-- Step 2: Set new master password (hidden until step 1 verified) -->
<div id="recover-step-2" class="hidden">
<h1 class="auth-title">Set a new master password</h1>
<p class="auth-step-hint">Your recovery code is valid. Choose a new master password — your vault will be re-encrypted automatically.</p>
<form id="recover-form-step2" novalidate>
<p id="recover-error-2" class="form-error hidden"></p>
<div class="form-group">
<label for="recover-new-pass">New master password</label>
<div class="input-with-toggle">
<input type="password" id="recover-new-pass" name="new_password" required
autocomplete="new-password" placeholder="Minimum 12 characters">
<button type="button" class="btn-show-pass" id="toggle-recover-pass"
aria-label="Toggle password visibility">👁</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="form-group">
<label for="recover-confirm-pass">Confirm new password</label>
<input type="password" id="recover-confirm-pass" name="confirm_password" required
autocomplete="new-password" placeholder="Repeat new password">
</div>
<button type="submit" class="btn-primary btn-full" data-loading-text="Recovering account…">
Recover account
</button>
</form>
</div>
</div>
</div>
{% endblock %}
{% block scripts %}
<script src="{{ url_for('static', filename='js/crypto.js') }}"></script>
<script src="{{ url_for('static', filename='js/recover.js') }}"></script>
{% endblock %}
+58
View File
@@ -335,6 +335,64 @@
<div id="sharing-keys-actions"></div>
</div>
<!-- Change Password Section -->
<div class="settings-section">
<h4 class="settings-section-title">🔑 Change Master Password</h4>
<p class="settings-desc">Your vault will be automatically re-encrypted with the new password.</p>
<div id="change-password-area">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="cp-current">Current master password</label>
<input type="password" id="cp-current" autocomplete="current-password" placeholder="Current password">
</div>
<div class="form-group">
<label for="cp-new">New master password</label>
<input type="password" id="cp-new" autocomplete="new-password" placeholder="Minimum 12 characters">
</div>
<div class="form-group">
<label for="cp-confirm">Confirm new password</label>
<input type="password" id="cp-confirm" autocomplete="new-password" placeholder="Repeat new password">
</div>
<p id="cp-error" class="form-error hidden"></p>
<button class="btn-primary" id="btn-change-password">Change Password</button>
</div>
</div>
<!-- Recovery Code Section -->
<div class="settings-section">
<h4 class="settings-section-title">🆘 Account Recovery</h4>
<p class="settings-desc">A recovery code lets you regain access if you forget your master password. Store it somewhere safe — it is shown only once and never stored on our servers.</p>
<p id="recovery-status-text" class="settings-desc"></p>
<div id="recovery-code-display" class="hidden">
<div class="recovery-code-box">
<code id="recovery-code-value"></code>
<button class="btn-icon" id="btn-copy-recovery-code" title="Copy to clipboard">📋</button>
</div>
<p class="settings-desc warning-text">⚠️ Copy this code now. It will not be shown again.</p>
<button class="btn-secondary" id="btn-recovery-done">I've saved my recovery code</button>
</div>
<div id="recovery-actions"></div>
</div>
<!-- Danger Zone -->
<div class="settings-section settings-section-danger">
<h4 class="settings-section-title">⚠️ Danger Zone</h4>
<p class="settings-desc">Permanently delete your account and all vault data. This cannot be undone.</p>
<div id="delete-account-area">
<div id="delete-confirm-area" class="hidden">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="delete-password">Enter your master password to confirm</label>
<input type="password" id="delete-password" autocomplete="current-password" placeholder="Master password">
</div>
<p id="delete-error" class="form-error hidden"></p>
<div class="modal-actions">
<button class="btn-secondary" id="btn-delete-cancel">Cancel</button>
<button class="btn-danger" id="btn-delete-confirm">Permanently Delete Account</button>
</div>
</div>
<button class="btn-danger" id="btn-delete-account">Delete My Account</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
"""add account recovery columns to users
Revision ID: b2c3d4e5f6a7
Revises: a1b2c3d4e5f6
Create Date: 2026-04-18 00:00:01.000000
Adds two nullable columns to users:
- recovery_enc_salt VARCHAR(128): enc_key_salt re-encrypted with the recovery key
- recovery_iv VARCHAR(64): 12-byte GCM nonce for the above (base64)
These are populated client-side when the user sets up account recovery.
NULL means no recovery code has been generated yet.
"""
from alembic import op
import sqlalchemy as sa
revision = 'b2c3d4e5f6a7'
down_revision = 'a1b2c3d4e5f6'
branch_labels = None
depends_on = None
def upgrade():
with op.batch_alter_table('users', schema=None) as batch_op:
batch_op.add_column(sa.Column('recovery_enc_salt', sa.String(length=128), nullable=True))
batch_op.add_column(sa.Column('recovery_iv', sa.String(length=64), nullable=True))
def downgrade():
with op.batch_alter_table('users', schema=None) as batch_op:
batch_op.drop_column('recovery_iv')
batch_op.drop_column('recovery_enc_salt')