/**
 * recover.js — Account recovery flow
 *
 * Step 1: User provides email + recovery code.
 *   - Fetch recovery data (recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv, nonce) from server.
 *     NOTE: enc_key_salt is NOT returned here — the client must derive it by
 *     decrypting the recovery blob with the recovery code.
 *   - Derive recovery key from the recovery code (PBKDF2).
 *   - Decrypt recovery_enc_salt using the recovery key → decrypted enc_key_salt.
 *   - If decryption succeeds, store decrypted enc_key_salt in module state → show step 2.
 *
 * Step 2: User provides new master password.
 *   - Derive new vault key from new password + new random enc_key_salt.
 *   - Fetch all vault items (still encrypted with old vault key).
 *   - Decrypt each item with old vault key (derived from old enc_key_salt + new password
 *     would fail — instead we re-derive old vault key from old enc_key_salt + new password
 *     which won't work either). Correct path:
 *     OLD vault key = PBKDF2(old_master_password, old_enc_key_salt)
 *     But we don't have the old master password. The recovery path therefore
 *     cannot re-encrypt vault items with a new key unless it can derive the OLD vault key.
 *
 * Recovery key design:
 *   recovery_key   = PBKDF2(recovery_code, "passkeeper-recovery", 200_000 iter)
 *   encrypted blob = AES-GCM(recovery_key, enc_key_salt)
 *
 * After decrypting enc_key_salt, the user sets a new master password:
 *   new_auth_hash    = PBKDF2(new_password, email, 100_000)
 *   new_enc_key_salt = random 16 bytes
 *   new_vault_key    = PBKDF2(new_password, new_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
 *
 * Vault items are re-encrypted using old_vault_key → new_vault_key:
 *   old_vault_key = PBKDF2(recovery_code, old_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
 *   — This is the KEY INSIGHT: the recovery code acts as a stand-in master password
 *     ONLY for the purpose of re-deriving the old vault key, since the recovery_key
 *     already proved the recovery code is correct by successfully decrypting enc_key_salt.
 *
 * The server verifies the recovery code is correct via `recovery_proof`:
 *   recovery_proof = old_enc_key_salt (plaintext)
 *   If the client decrypted recovery_enc_salt correctly, it will have the true enc_key_salt.
 *   The server compares recovery_proof === user.enc_key_salt.
 */

const Recover = (() => {
  const subtle = window.crypto.subtle;

  // Module state between step 1 and step 2
  let _email = null;
  let _recoveryCode = null;
  let _oldEncKeySalt = null; // decrypted from recovery blob
  let _oldVaultKey = null; // derived for re-encrypting vault items
  let _recoveryProof = null; // HMAC-SHA256(enc_key_salt_bytes, nonce) — sent as proof

  // ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

  function strToBytes(str) {
    return new TextEncoder().encode(str);
  }

  function base64ToBytes(b64) {
    const bin = atob(b64);
    const bytes = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
    for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) bytes[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
    return bytes;
  }

  function bytesToBase64(bytes) {
    let bin = "";
    bytes.forEach((b) => (bin += String.fromCharCode(b)));
    return btoa(bin);
  }

  function formatRecoveryCode(raw) {
    // Display as groups of 4 for readability
    return raw.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join("-") ?? raw;
  }

  function cleanRecoveryCode(input) {
    // Strip hyphens/spaces so users can paste formatted or raw codes
    return input.replace(/[-\s]/g, "").toLowerCase();
  }

  function showError(id, message) {
    const el = document.getElementById(id);
    if (el) {
      el.textContent = message;
      el.classList.remove("hidden");
    }
  }

  function hideError(id) {
    const el = document.getElementById(id);
    if (el) el.classList.add("hidden");
  }

  function setLoading(btn, loading) {
    btn.disabled = loading;
    btn.textContent = loading
      ? btn.dataset.loadingText || "Please wait…"
      : btn.dataset.originalText || btn.textContent;
  }

  // ── Crypto ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

  /**
   * Derive an AES-256-GCM key from the recovery code using PBKDF2.
   * `salt` should be the user's email (per-user uniqueness).
   * Falls back to the legacy fixed salt for backward compatibility.
   */
  async function deriveRecoveryKey(recoveryCode, salt = "passkeeper-recovery") {
    const baseKey = await subtle.importKey(
      "raw",
      strToBytes(recoveryCode),
      "PBKDF2",
      false,
      ["deriveKey"],
    );
    return subtle.deriveKey(
      {
        name: "PBKDF2",
        salt: strToBytes(salt),
        iterations: 200_000,
        hash: "SHA-256",
      },
      baseKey,
      { name: "AES-GCM", length: 256 },
      false,
      ["encrypt", "decrypt"],
    );
  }

  /**
   * Encrypt enc_key_salt (string) with the recovery key.
   * Returns { recovery_enc_salt: base64, recovery_iv: base64 }
   */
  async function encryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, encKeySalt) {
    const iv = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
    const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(
      { name: "AES-GCM", iv },
      recoveryKey,
      strToBytes(encKeySalt),
    );
    return {
      recovery_enc_salt: bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(ciphertext)),
      recovery_iv: bytesToBase64(iv),
    };
  }

  /**
   * Decrypt recovery_enc_salt to recover the original enc_key_salt string.
   * Throws DOMException if the recovery code is wrong (GCM auth tag mismatch).
   */
  async function decryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, recoveryEncSalt, recoveryIv) {
    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(
      { name: "AES-GCM", iv: base64ToBytes(recoveryIv) },
      recoveryKey,
      base64ToBytes(recoveryEncSalt),
    );
    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext);
  }

  /**
   * Derive the recovery verifier: 256 bits of PBKDF2 over the recovery code,
   * salted with a domain-separated label plus the user's email, as 64 hex chars.
   *
   * This is the HMAC key for the recovery challenge under the current scheme.
   * It depends on the recovery code alone and is used for nothing else, so it
   * cannot be derived from enc_key_salt (which the server hands to any client
   * that clears the password factor).
   *
   * Must stay byte-identical to _deriveRecoveryVerifier() in vault.js.
   */
  async function deriveRecoveryVerifier(recoveryCode, email) {
    const baseKey = await subtle.importKey(
      "raw",
      strToBytes(recoveryCode),
      "PBKDF2",
      false,
      ["deriveBits"],
    );
    const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(
      {
        name: "PBKDF2",
        salt: strToBytes(
          "passkeeper-recovery-verifier:" + email.toLowerCase(),
        ),
        iterations: 200_000,
        hash: "SHA-256",
      },
      baseKey,
      256,
    );
    return Array.from(new Uint8Array(bits))
      .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
      .join("");
  }

  /**
   * Compute the HMAC-SHA256 recovery proof: HMAC(key=proofKey, msg=nonce).
   *
   * proofKey is the recovery verifier for codes generated under the current
   * scheme, or — for codes predating it — the enc_key_salt decrypted out of the
   * recovery blob. The server tells us which via `proof_scheme` on
   * /recovery/data. Either way the proof demonstrates possession of the
   * recovery code without transmitting anything reusable.
   */
  async function computeRecoveryProof(proofKey, nonce) {
    const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(
      "raw",
      strToBytes(proofKey),
      { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },
      false,
      ["sign"],
    );
    const signature = await subtle.sign("HMAC", keyMaterial, strToBytes(nonce));
    // Convert to hex string to match Python's hmac.hexdigest()
    return Array.from(new Uint8Array(signature))
      .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
      .join("");
  }

  // ── Step 1: Verify recovery code ───────────────────────────────────────────

  async function handleStep1(e) {
    e.preventDefault();
    hideError("recover-error-1");
    const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
    btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
    setLoading(btn, true);

    try {
      const email = document
        .getElementById("recover-email")
        .value.trim()
        .toLowerCase();
      const rawCode = cleanRecoveryCode(
        document.getElementById("recover-code").value.trim(),
      );

      if (!email || !rawCode) {
        showError("recover-error-1", "Email and recovery code are required.");
        return;
      }

      // Fetch recovery blobs from server
      const res = await fetch(
        `/api/auth/recovery/data?email=${encodeURIComponent(email)}`,
      );
      if (!res.ok) {
        showError(
          "recover-error-1",
          "No recovery code found for this account.",
        );
        return;
      }
      const data = await res.json();

      // Attempt to decrypt enc_key_salt using the recovery code.
      // Try email-as-salt first (new format), fall back to the legacy fixed salt
      // so that recovery codes generated before this fix still work.
      let decryptedEncKeySalt;
      try {
        const keyWithEmail = await deriveRecoveryKey(rawCode, email);
        try {
          decryptedEncKeySalt = await decryptEncKeySalt(
            keyWithEmail,
            data.recovery_enc_salt,
            data.recovery_iv,
          );
        } catch {
          const keyLegacy = await deriveRecoveryKey(rawCode);
          decryptedEncKeySalt = await decryptEncKeySalt(
            keyLegacy,
            data.recovery_enc_salt,
            data.recovery_iv,
          );
        }
      } catch {
        showError(
          "recover-error-1",
          "Invalid recovery code. Please check and try again.",
        );
        return;
      }

      // Key the proof on the recovery verifier when the account has one.
      // Legacy accounts (recovery code created before recovery_verifier existed)
      // still key it on the decrypted enc_key_salt; regenerating the code from
      // Settings migrates them.
      const proofKey =
        data.proof_scheme === "verifier"
          ? await deriveRecoveryVerifier(rawCode, email)
          : decryptedEncKeySalt;
      const proof = await computeRecoveryProof(proofKey, data.nonce);

      // Derive the old vault key using the recovery code as master password proxy
      _oldVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(rawCode, decryptedEncKeySalt);

      _email = email;
      _recoveryCode = rawCode;
      _oldEncKeySalt = decryptedEncKeySalt;
      _recoveryProof = proof;

      // Show step 2
      document.getElementById("recover-step-1").classList.add("hidden");
      document.getElementById("recover-step-2").classList.remove("hidden");
      document.getElementById("recover-new-pass").focus();
    } catch (err) {
      showError(
        "recover-error-1",
        "An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.",
      );
      console.error(err);
    } finally {
      setLoading(btn, false);
    }
  }

  // ── Step 2: Set new password + re-encrypt vault ────────────────────────────

  async function handleStep2(e) {
    e.preventDefault();
    hideError("recover-error-2");
    const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
    btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
    setLoading(btn, true);

    try {
      const newPassword = document.getElementById("recover-new-pass").value;
      const confirmPassword = document.getElementById(
        "recover-confirm-pass",
      ).value;

      if (newPassword !== confirmPassword) {
        showError("recover-error-2", "Passwords do not match.");
        return;
      }
      if (newPassword.length < 12) {
        showError(
          "recover-error-2",
          "Password must be at least 12 characters.",
        );
        return;
      }

      // Derive new credentials
      const newAuthHash = await Crypto.deriveAuthHash(newPassword, _email);
      const newEncKeySalt = Crypto.generateSalt(16);
      const newVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(
        newPassword,
        newEncKeySalt,
      );

      // Fetch all vault items (encrypted with old vault key)
      // We use a minimal unauthenticated fetch here — items are still ciphertext on the wire.
      // We need a temporary token. Since we haven't authenticated yet, we use recovery_proof
      // to get a token from the /recover endpoint directly.
      // For the item fetch step, we issue the recovery call with empty items first to get tokens,
      // then re-encrypt. However, to keep this atomic, we fetch items via a pre-recovery token.
      // Simpler correct approach: fetch items as part of the /recover payload.
      // We'll get a session token only after /recover succeeds. So we must send items inline.

      // Fetch vault items using a preliminary unauthenticated endpoint is not ideal.
      // Instead: call /recover with items=[] to get a session token, fetch items, re-encrypt,
      // then call /api/auth/change-password to update. But that's two round trips and not atomic.

      // Correct atomic approach: use the recovery endpoint directly with all re-encrypted items.
      // To fetch items without auth, we need to log in with the old vault key... which we can't.
      // Solution: the /recover endpoint issues tokens. We fetch items BEFORE calling /recover
      // using no auth (items are ciphertext anyway, safe to expose to the authenticated session),
      // OR we make /recover accept an optional items array and handle both cases.

      // Implemented here: call /recover with items included.
      // But we need items to re-encrypt first. To get items, we must be authenticated.
      // We solve this by having the server issue a temporary session from /recover/data endpoint,
      // or more practically: fetch items unauthenticated with just the email to get encrypted blobs.
      // Since items are ciphertext and we verify recovery code server-side, this is acceptable.

      // Fetch items unauthenticated via a recovery-scoped endpoint
      const itemsRes = await fetch(
        `/api/auth/recovery/items?email=${encodeURIComponent(_email)}`,
        {
          headers: { "X-Recovery-Proof": _recoveryProof },
        },
      );

      if (!itemsRes.ok) {
        showError(
          "recover-error-2",
          "Could not load your vault items. Please restart the recovery process.",
        );
        return;
      }

      let reEncryptedItems = [];
      let totalItems = 0;
      const failedItemIds = [];
      {
        const itemsData = await itemsRes.json();
        totalItems = itemsData.items.length;
        // Re-encrypt each item: old vault key → new vault key
        for (const item of itemsData.items) {
          try {
            const plain = await Crypto.decryptItem(
              _oldVaultKey,
              item.enc_data,
              item.iv,
            );
            const { enc_data, iv } = await Crypto.encryptItem(newVaultKey, plain);
            let encNamePayload = {};
            if (item.enc_name && item.iv_name) {
              const plainName = await Crypto.decryptName(
                _oldVaultKey,
                item.enc_name,
                item.iv_name,
              );
              if (plainName) {
                const { enc_name, iv_name } = await Crypto.encryptName(
                  newVaultKey,
                  plainName,
                );
                encNamePayload = { enc_name, iv_name };
              }
            }
            reEncryptedItems.push({ id: item.id, enc_data, iv, ...encNamePayload });
          } catch {
            // Item decryption failed — record it. The server refuses to rotate
            // the key unless every item is covered, so we must either resolve
            // this or have the user explicitly accept losing these items.
            failedItemIds.push(item.id);
            console.warn(`Could not re-encrypt item ${item.id}`);
          }
        }
      }

      // Completing recovery rotates enc_key_salt, which permanently orphans any
      // item still encrypted under the old key. Unlike the change-password flow
      // we cannot simply refuse — the user is locked out of their account and
      // has no other way in — so we surface the exact cost and let them decide.
      let allowPartial = false;
      if (reEncryptedItems.length !== totalItems) {
        const lost = totalItems - reEncryptedItems.length;
        const proceed = confirm(
          `${lost} of your ${totalItems} vault item(s) could not be decrypted ` +
            `with this recovery code and cannot be carried over.

` +
            `Continuing will recover your account and the other ` +
            `${reEncryptedItems.length} item(s), but those ${lost} item(s) will ` +
            `be permanently unreadable.

Continue with recovery?`,
        );
        if (!proceed) {
          showError(
            "recover-error-2",
            "Recovery cancelled. Your account is unchanged.",
          );
          return;
        }
        allowPartial = true;
      }

      // Submit recovery
      const recoverRes = await fetch("/api/auth/recover", {
        method: "POST",
        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
        body: JSON.stringify({
          email: _email,
          new_auth_hash: newAuthHash,
          new_enc_key_salt: newEncKeySalt,
          recovery_proof: _recoveryProof,
          items: reEncryptedItems,
          allow_partial: allowPartial,
        }),
      });

      const recoverData = await recoverRes.json();
      if (!recoverRes.ok) {
        showError(
          "recover-error-2",
          recoverData.error || "Recovery failed. Please try again.",
        );
        return;
      }

      // Store session and redirect
      sessionStorage.setItem("access_token", recoverData.access_token);
      localStorage.setItem("refresh_token", recoverData.refresh_token);
      sessionStorage.setItem("enc_key_salt", recoverData.enc_key_salt);

      // Set vault key in VaultSession so unlock overlay is skipped
      const finalVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(
        newPassword,
        recoverData.enc_key_salt,
      );
      VaultSession.setKey(finalVaultKey);

      window.location.href = "/vault?recovered=1";
    } catch (err) {
      showError(
        "recover-error-2",
        "An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.",
      );
      console.error(err);
    } finally {
      setLoading(btn, false);
    }
  }

  // ── Init ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

  function init() {
    document
      .getElementById("recover-form-step1")
      ?.addEventListener("submit", handleStep1);
    document
      .getElementById("recover-form-step2")
      ?.addEventListener("submit", handleStep2);

    const toggleBtn = document.getElementById("toggle-recover-pass");
    const passInput = document.getElementById("recover-new-pass");
    if (toggleBtn && passInput) {
      toggleBtn.addEventListener("click", () => {
        passInput.type = passInput.type === "password" ? "text" : "password";
      });
    }
  }

  // Public surface needed by recover.html (no VaultSession on recover page)
  return { init };
})();

// Minimal VaultSession stub (not used during recovery but imported by crypto.js chain)
const VaultSession = (() => {
  let _key = null;
  return {
    setKey(k) {
      _key = k;
    },
    getKey() {
      return _key;
    },
    clear() {
      _key = null;
    },
  };
})();

document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", Recover.init);