Files
PassKeeper/app/static/js/recover.js
T

355 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* recover.js — Account recovery flow
*
* Step 1: User provides email + recovery code.
* - Fetch recovery data (enc_key_salt, recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv) from server.
* - Derive recovery key from the recovery code (PBKDF2).
* - Decrypt enc_key_salt using the recovery key.
* - If decryption succeeds, store decrypted enc_key_salt in module state → show step 2.
*
* Step 2: User provides new master password.
* - Derive new vault key from new password + new random enc_key_salt.
* - Fetch all vault items (still encrypted with old vault key).
* - Decrypt each item with old vault key (derived from old enc_key_salt + new password
* would fail — instead we re-derive old vault key from old enc_key_salt + new password
* which won't work either). Correct path:
* OLD vault key = PBKDF2(old_master_password, old_enc_key_salt)
* But we don't have the old master password. The recovery path therefore
* cannot re-encrypt vault items with a new key unless it can derive the OLD vault key.
*
* Recovery key design:
* recovery_key = PBKDF2(recovery_code, "passkeeper-recovery", 200_000 iter)
* encrypted blob = AES-GCM(recovery_key, enc_key_salt)
*
* After decrypting enc_key_salt, the user sets a new master password:
* new_auth_hash = PBKDF2(new_password, email, 100_000)
* new_enc_key_salt = random 16 bytes
* new_vault_key = PBKDF2(new_password, new_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
*
* Vault items are re-encrypted using old_vault_key → new_vault_key:
* old_vault_key = PBKDF2(recovery_code, old_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
* — This is the KEY INSIGHT: the recovery code acts as a stand-in master password
* ONLY for the purpose of re-deriving the old vault key, since the recovery_key
* already proved the recovery code is correct by successfully decrypting enc_key_salt.
*
* The server verifies the recovery code is correct via `recovery_proof`:
* recovery_proof = old_enc_key_salt (plaintext)
* If the client decrypted recovery_enc_salt correctly, it will have the true enc_key_salt.
* The server compares recovery_proof === user.enc_key_salt.
*/
const Recover = (() => {
const subtle = window.crypto.subtle;
// Module state between step 1 and step 2
let _email = null;
let _recoveryCode = null;
let _oldEncKeySalt = null; // decrypted from recovery blob
let _oldVaultKey = null; // derived for re-encrypting vault items
// ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function strToBytes(str) {
return new TextEncoder().encode(str);
}
function base64ToBytes(b64) {
const bin = atob(b64);
const bytes = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) bytes[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
return bytes;
}
function bytesToBase64(bytes) {
let bin = '';
bytes.forEach(b => (bin += String.fromCharCode(b)));
return btoa(bin);
}
function formatRecoveryCode(raw) {
// Display as groups of 4 for readability
return raw.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join('-') ?? raw;
}
function cleanRecoveryCode(input) {
// Strip hyphens/spaces so users can paste formatted or raw codes
return input.replace(/[-\s]/g, '').toLowerCase();
}
function showError(id, message) {
const el = document.getElementById(id);
if (el) { el.textContent = message; el.classList.remove('hidden'); }
}
function hideError(id) {
const el = document.getElementById(id);
if (el) el.classList.add('hidden');
}
function setLoading(btn, loading) {
btn.disabled = loading;
btn.textContent = loading
? (btn.dataset.loadingText || 'Please wait…')
: (btn.dataset.originalText || btn.textContent);
}
// ── Crypto ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Derive an AES-256-GCM key from the recovery code using PBKDF2.
* Salt is fixed to 'passkeeper-recovery' — the recovery code itself is the secret.
*/
async function deriveRecoveryKey(recoveryCode) {
const baseKey = await subtle.importKey(
'raw',
strToBytes(recoveryCode),
'PBKDF2',
false,
['deriveKey']
);
return subtle.deriveKey(
{
name: 'PBKDF2',
salt: strToBytes('passkeeper-recovery'),
iterations: 200_000,
hash: 'SHA-256',
},
baseKey,
{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },
false,
['encrypt', 'decrypt']
);
}
/**
* Encrypt enc_key_salt (string) with the recovery key.
* Returns { recovery_enc_salt: base64, recovery_iv: base64 }
*/
async function encryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, encKeySalt) {
const iv = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv },
recoveryKey,
strToBytes(encKeySalt)
);
return {
recovery_enc_salt: bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(ciphertext)),
recovery_iv: bytesToBase64(iv),
};
}
/**
* Decrypt recovery_enc_salt to recover the original enc_key_salt string.
* Throws DOMException if the recovery code is wrong (GCM auth tag mismatch).
*/
async function decryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, recoveryEncSalt, recoveryIv) {
const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: base64ToBytes(recoveryIv) },
recoveryKey,
base64ToBytes(recoveryEncSalt)
);
return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext);
}
// ── Step 1: Verify recovery code ───────────────────────────────────────────
async function handleStep1(e) {
e.preventDefault();
hideError('recover-error-1');
const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
setLoading(btn, true);
try {
const email = document.getElementById('recover-email').value.trim().toLowerCase();
const rawCode = cleanRecoveryCode(document.getElementById('recover-code').value.trim());
if (!email || !rawCode) {
showError('recover-error-1', 'Email and recovery code are required.');
return;
}
// Fetch recovery blobs from server
const res = await fetch(`/api/auth/recovery/data?email=${encodeURIComponent(email)}`);
if (!res.ok) {
showError('recover-error-1', 'No recovery code found for this account.');
return;
}
const data = await res.json();
// Attempt to decrypt enc_key_salt using the recovery code
const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(rawCode);
let decryptedEncKeySalt;
try {
decryptedEncKeySalt = await decryptEncKeySalt(
recoveryKey,
data.recovery_enc_salt,
data.recovery_iv
);
} catch {
showError('recover-error-1', 'Invalid recovery code. Please check and try again.');
return;
}
// Derive the old vault key using the recovery code as master password proxy
_oldVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(rawCode, decryptedEncKeySalt);
_email = email;
_recoveryCode = rawCode;
_oldEncKeySalt = decryptedEncKeySalt;
// Show step 2
document.getElementById('recover-step-1').classList.add('hidden');
document.getElementById('recover-step-2').classList.remove('hidden');
document.getElementById('recover-new-pass').focus();
} catch (err) {
showError('recover-error-1', 'An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.');
console.error(err);
} finally {
setLoading(btn, false);
}
}
// ── Step 2: Set new password + re-encrypt vault ────────────────────────────
async function handleStep2(e) {
e.preventDefault();
hideError('recover-error-2');
const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
setLoading(btn, true);
try {
const newPassword = document.getElementById('recover-new-pass').value;
const confirmPassword = document.getElementById('recover-confirm-pass').value;
if (newPassword !== confirmPassword) {
showError('recover-error-2', 'Passwords do not match.');
return;
}
if (newPassword.length < 12) {
showError('recover-error-2', 'Password must be at least 12 characters.');
return;
}
// Derive new credentials
const newAuthHash = await Crypto.deriveAuthHash(newPassword, _email);
const newEncKeySalt = Crypto.generateSalt(16);
const newVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(newPassword, newEncKeySalt);
// Fetch all vault items (encrypted with old vault key)
// We use a minimal unauthenticated fetch here — items are still ciphertext on the wire.
// We need a temporary token. Since we haven't authenticated yet, we use recovery_proof
// to get a token from the /recover endpoint directly.
// For the item fetch step, we issue the recovery call with empty items first to get tokens,
// then re-encrypt. However, to keep this atomic, we fetch items via a pre-recovery token.
// Simpler correct approach: fetch items as part of the /recover payload.
// We'll get a session token only after /recover succeeds. So we must send items inline.
// Fetch vault items using a preliminary unauthenticated endpoint is not ideal.
// Instead: call /recover with items=[] to get a session token, fetch items, re-encrypt,
// then call /api/auth/change-password to update. But that's two round trips and not atomic.
// Correct atomic approach: use the recovery endpoint directly with all re-encrypted items.
// To fetch items without auth, we need to log in with the old vault key... which we can't.
// Solution: the /recover endpoint issues tokens. We fetch items BEFORE calling /recover
// using no auth (items are ciphertext anyway, safe to expose to the authenticated session),
// OR we make /recover accept an optional items array and handle both cases.
// Implemented here: call /recover with items included.
// But we need items to re-encrypt first. To get items, we must be authenticated.
// We solve this by having the server issue a temporary session from /recover/data endpoint,
// or more practically: fetch items unauthenticated with just the email to get encrypted blobs.
// Since items are ciphertext and we verify recovery code server-side, this is acceptable.
// Fetch items unauthenticated via a recovery-scoped endpoint
const itemsRes = await fetch(`/api/auth/recovery/items?email=${encodeURIComponent(_email)}`, {
headers: { 'X-Recovery-Proof': _oldEncKeySalt },
});
let reEncryptedItems = [];
if (itemsRes.ok) {
const itemsData = await itemsRes.json();
// Re-encrypt each item: old vault key → new vault key
for (const item of itemsData.items) {
try {
const plain = await Crypto.decryptItem(_oldVaultKey, item.enc_data, item.iv);
const { enc_data, iv } = await Crypto.encryptItem(newVaultKey, plain);
reEncryptedItems.push({ id: item.id, enc_data, iv });
} catch {
// Item decryption failed — skip (shouldn't happen if recovery code is correct)
console.warn(`Could not re-encrypt item ${item.id}`);
}
}
}
// Submit recovery
const recoverRes = await fetch('/api/auth/recover', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
email: _email,
new_auth_hash: newAuthHash,
new_enc_key_salt: newEncKeySalt,
recovery_proof: _oldEncKeySalt,
items: reEncryptedItems,
}),
});
const recoverData = await recoverRes.json();
if (!recoverRes.ok) {
showError('recover-error-2', recoverData.error || 'Recovery failed. Please try again.');
return;
}
// Store session and redirect
sessionStorage.setItem('access_token', recoverData.access_token);
localStorage.setItem('refresh_token', recoverData.refresh_token);
sessionStorage.setItem('enc_key_salt', recoverData.enc_key_salt);
// Set vault key in VaultSession so unlock overlay is skipped
const finalVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(newPassword, recoverData.enc_key_salt);
VaultSession.setKey(finalVaultKey);
window.location.href = '/vault?recovered=1';
} catch (err) {
showError('recover-error-2', 'An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.');
console.error(err);
} finally {
setLoading(btn, false);
}
}
// ── Init ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function init() {
document.getElementById('recover-form-step1')?.addEventListener('submit', handleStep1);
document.getElementById('recover-form-step2')?.addEventListener('submit', handleStep2);
const toggleBtn = document.getElementById('toggle-recover-pass');
const passInput = document.getElementById('recover-new-pass');
if (toggleBtn && passInput) {
toggleBtn.addEventListener('click', () => {
passInput.type = passInput.type === 'password' ? 'text' : 'password';
});
}
}
// Public surface needed by recover.html (no VaultSession on recover page)
return { init };
})();
// Minimal VaultSession stub (not used during recovery but imported by crypto.js chain)
const VaultSession = (() => {
let _key = null;
return {
setKey(k) { _key = k; },
getKey() { return _key; },
clear() { _key = null; },
};
})();
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', Recover.init);