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82 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
82 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from flask_login import UserMixin
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from sqlalchemy.dialects.mysql import INTEGER
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from app import db
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class User(db.Model, UserMixin):
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__tablename__ = 'users'
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id = db.Column(INTEGER(unsigned=True), autoincrement=True, primary_key=True)
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email = db.Column(db.String(255), unique=True, nullable=False, index=True)
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# master_hash: Argon2id hash of the client-derived PBKDF2 auth_hash
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# The raw master password is NEVER sent to or stored on the server.
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master_hash = db.Column(db.String(255), nullable=False)
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# enc_key_salt: random 16-byte salt (base64) generated at registration.
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# Returned to the client on login so it can re-derive the AES-256-GCM vault key.
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# The server never uses this for decryption — it is opaque to us.
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enc_key_salt = db.Column(db.String(64), nullable=False)
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created_at = db.Column(db.DateTime, default=lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None), nullable=False)
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last_login = db.Column(db.DateTime, nullable=True)
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# TOTP / MFA
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# totp_secret: AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the base32 TOTP secret, base64-encoded.
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# Encrypted server-side with the TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY from config.
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# totp_iv: base64-encoded 12-byte GCM nonce for the above.
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totp_secret = db.Column(db.String(255), nullable=True)
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totp_iv = db.Column(db.String(64), nullable=True)
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totp_enabled = db.Column(db.Boolean, default=False, nullable=False)
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# ECDH P-256 sharing keypair
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# Public key: raw uncompressed point (65 bytes), base64-encoded (~88 chars), stored plaintext
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sharing_public_key = db.Column(db.String(128), nullable=True)
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# Private key: JWK, AES-256-GCM encrypted with the user's vault key
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sharing_private_key_enc = db.Column(db.Text, nullable=True)
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sharing_private_key_iv = db.Column(db.String(64), nullable=True)
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# Account recovery — enc_key_salt re-encrypted with a client-derived recovery key.
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# NULL means the user has not set up a recovery code yet.
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# The server never sees the recovery code — only the ciphertext of enc_key_salt.
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recovery_enc_salt = db.Column(db.String(128), nullable=True)
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recovery_iv = db.Column(db.String(64), nullable=True)
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# recovery_verifier: 64 hex chars (256 bits), derived client-side from the
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# recovery code ALONE:
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# PBKDF2(recovery_code, "passkeeper-recovery-verifier:" + email, 200k, SHA-256)
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# Used only as the HMAC key for the recovery challenge-response proof.
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# It is deliberately independent of enc_key_salt: enc_key_salt doubles as the
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# vault-key PBKDF2 salt and is handed to the client at login, so keying the
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# proof with it let anyone holding the password forge a proof and pull the
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# whole encrypted vault from /recovery/items without a second factor.
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# NULL = legacy recovery code; the proof falls back to enc_key_salt.
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recovery_verifier = db.Column(db.String(64), nullable=True)
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# Brute-force lockout — incremented on every failed login attempt,
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# reset to 0 on success. locked_until is set to now()+15min after
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# MAX_FAILED_LOGINS consecutive failures.
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failed_login_count = db.Column(db.Integer, default=0, nullable=False, server_default='0')
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locked_until = db.Column(db.DateTime, nullable=True)
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# MFA backup codes — JSON array of Argon2id-hashed one-time codes.
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# Each code is consumed (removed from the array) on use.
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# NULL means no backup codes have been generated yet.
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mfa_backup_codes = db.Column(db.Text, nullable=True)
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# Session generation counter. Every issued JWT carries the value current at
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# the time it was minted; require_jwt rejects tokens whose claim no longer
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# matches. Incrementing this revokes every outstanding access and refresh
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# token at once, which is what a master-password change must do — otherwise
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# a stolen refresh token outlives the password it was obtained under.
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# Tokens issued before this column existed decode with epoch 0 and stay
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# valid until the next credential change.
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token_epoch = db.Column(db.Integer, default=0, nullable=False, server_default='0')
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folders = db.relationship('Folder', backref='owner', lazy='dynamic', cascade='all, delete-orphan')
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vault_items = db.relationship('VaultItem', backref='owner', lazy='dynamic', cascade='all, delete-orphan')
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# NOTE: there is intentionally no check_password() here.
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#
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# It existed, was called from nowhere, and used default Argon2 parameters
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# with no rehash-on-login handling — so any caller that found it would have
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# silently bypassed the transparent parameter upgrade in
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# auth_service.verify_auth_token(). Verification goes through
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# verify_auth_token(auth_hash, user.master_hash, user=user) so the stored
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# hash is upgraded when ARGON2_* settings change.
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def __repr__(self):
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return f'<User {self.email}>'
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