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PassKeeper/CLAUDE.md
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nngo 517f4dab61 04/26 Enhanced functionalities
2026-04-26 10:10:29 -04:00

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# PassKeeper — Password Manager Web App & Browser Extension
## Project Overview
A full-featured password manager web app and browser extension modelled after LastPass. Users can store, organise, and autofill credentials securely with a zero-knowledge architecture.
---
## Tech Stack
### Development (Windows)
- **Backend:** Python 3.12, Flask 3.x
- **Database:** MySQL 8.x
- **Frontend:** Vanilla JS (Web Crypto API) + Jinja2 templates
- **Dev server:** `python run.py`
### Production (Ubuntu)
- **Web server:** Nginx (reverse proxy, TLS termination)
- **WSGI server:** Gunicorn
- **Process manager:** systemd
- **Database:** MySQL 8.x
- **TLS:** Let's Encrypt / Certbot
---
## Architecture
```
Browser Extension <──────────────────────────────────────┐
Web App <──> Nginx ──> Gunicorn ──> Flask App │
│ │
MySQL DB │
│
REST API (JSON, HTTPS) ───────┘
```
### Project File Structure
```
passkeeper/
├── app/
│ ├── __init__.py # App factory (blueprints, extensions, CSRF exemptions, security headers)
│ ├── config.py # DevelopmentConfig / ProductionConfig (TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, CORS_ORIGINS, RATELIMIT_STORAGE_URI)
│ ├── models/
│ │ ├── user.py # User model (Argon2id, TOTP encrypted, ECDH sharing keys, recovery columns)
│ │ ├── vault_item.py # VaultItem model (enc_data, iv, enc_name, iv_name — all sensitive fields encrypted)
│ │ ├── folder.py # Folder model
│ │ ├── token_blacklist.py # JWT revocation on logout (jti + expires_at)
│ │ ├── shared_item.py # Cross-user ECDH-encrypted item shares
│ │ ├── emergency_access.py # Emergency access grants (state machine)
│ │ └── audit_log.py # Server-side audit trail for all CUD actions
│ ├── routes/
│ │ ├── auth.py # Register, login, MFA/TOTP, logout, refresh, change-password, delete-account, recovery
│ │ ├── vault.py # CRUD vault items (accepts enc_name/iv_name on create/update)
│ │ ├── folders.py # CRUD folders
│ │ ├── sharing.py # ECDH key exchange + zero-knowledge item sharing
│ │ └── emergency.py # Emergency access state machine
│ ├── services/
│ │ └── auth_service.py # Argon2id hashing, JWT generation, blacklist, @require_jwt, TOTP encrypt/decrypt
│ ├── static/
│ │ ├── css/app.css # Full responsive stylesheet (phone/tablet/laptop/PC breakpoints)
│ │ └── js/
│ │ ├── crypto.js # Web Crypto API: deriveAuthHash, deriveVaultKey, encryptItem, decryptItem,
│ │ │ # encryptName, decryptName, generateSalt
│ │ ├── auth.js # Login/register forms + TOTP MFA step + VaultSession
│ │ ├── recover.js # Account recovery flow (two-step: verify code → set new password)
│ │ ├── sharing.js # ECDH P-256 key generation, encrypt/decrypt for sharing
│ │ └── vault.js # Vault UI: all views + sidebar toggle + change-password + recovery + delete-account
│ │ # renderSecurityDashboard is async — runs HIBP k-anonymity checks after sync sections
│ └── templates/
│ ├── base.html # CSP meta, csrf-token meta, viewport meta, no inline scripts/styles
│ ├── auth/
│ │ ├── login.html # Login + MFA step + "Forgot password?" link
│ │ ├── register.html
│ │ └── recover.html # Two-step account recovery page
│ └── vault/
│ └── index.html # Sidebar (collapsible), mobile topbar, vault list, modals
├── extension/ # Browser extension (Manifest V3)
│ ├── manifest.json # MV3: permissions, content_scripts, background, action
│ ├── background.js # Service worker: badge count, save-credentials relay, SSO sync,
│ │ # KEEPALIVE ping handler, OPEN_VAULT tab opener
│ ├── shared/
│ │ └── crypto.js # Same PBKDF2+AES-GCM logic; extractable vault key for session storage;
│ │ # encryptName / decryptName helpers for item name encryption
│ ├── popup/
│ │ ├── popup.html # Login → MFA → Unlock-only → Vault → Generator → Add Item views
│ │ ├── popup.css # Includes generator styles, save-modal overlay, pk-flyout context menu
│ │ └── popup.js # Auth, vault fetch/decrypt (decrypts enc_name), tabs, autofill trigger,
│ │ # inline password generator (fully CSPRNG via _cryptoRandInt),
│ │ # save-prompt modal, copy-username button, three-dot flyout menu,
│ │ # SSO, service-worker keepalive, relevant-tab domain filter
│ ├── content/
│ │ └── content.js # Form detection; _isLikelyUsernameField heuristic (autocomplete/name/id scoring);
│ │ # injects PK icon into username AND password fields only;
│ │ # debounced input handler (150ms); MutationObserver guards against
│ │ # re-triggering on extension's own DOM mutations;
│ │ # _normaliseUrl handles bare domains ("github.com")
│ ├── bridge/
│ │ └── bridge.js # SSO bridge (runs on vault domain only): syncs session web↔extension
│ ├── icons/ # Generated by make_icons.py (Pillow)
│ │ ├── icon16.png
│ │ ├── icon48.png
│ │ └── icon128.png
│ └── make_icons.py # Re-run to regenerate icons: python extension/make_icons.py
├── migrations/
│ ├── env.py # Alembic env (Flask-Migrate)
│ ├── script.py.mako
│ └── versions/
│ ├── 71d7158dd3b9_add_audit_log_tables_fix_sharing_public_.py
│ ├── a1b2c3d4e5f6_encrypt_totp_secret_at_rest.py # Widens totp_secret + adds totp_iv
│ ├── b2c3d4e5f6a7_add_account_recovery_columns.py # Adds recovery_enc_salt + recovery_iv
│ └── c3d4e5f6a7b8_encrypt_vault_item_name.py # Adds enc_name + iv_name to vault_items
├── scripts/
│ ├── reencrypt_totp_secrets.py # One-time migration: encrypt existing plaintext TOTP secrets
│ ├── backup_db.sh # Automated MySQL backup (gzip, 30-day retention)
│ ├── backup.cron # Crontab entry for daily 2 AM backup
│ ├── passkeeper-logrotate # logrotate config for Gunicorn logs
│ ├── passkeeper-nginx.conf # Hardened Nginx config (HSTS, rate limiting, upstream retry)
│ └── passkeeper.service # Hardened systemd unit (watchdog, preload, sandboxing)
├── reset_db.py # Drop + recreate all tables (dev only, handles FK checks)
├── requirements.txt
├── wsgi.py # Gunicorn entry point
├── run.py # Dev entry point
├── .env
└── CLAUDE.md
```
---
## Database Schema (MySQL)
```sql
-- Users
CREATE TABLE users (
id INT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
email VARCHAR(255) UNIQUE NOT NULL,
master_hash VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, -- Argon2id hash of client-derived PBKDF2 auth_hash
enc_key_salt VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL, -- Random 16-byte salt (base64), returned on login
created_at DATETIME DEFAULT NOW(),
last_login DATETIME,
-- TOTP / MFA (secret AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest)
totp_secret VARCHAR(255), -- AES-256-GCM ciphertext of base32 secret (base64)
totp_iv VARCHAR(64), -- base64 12-byte GCM nonce for totp_secret
totp_enabled TINYINT(1) DEFAULT 0,
-- ECDH P-256 sharing keypair
sharing_public_key VARCHAR(128), -- Raw uncompressed point (65 bytes), base64, plaintext
sharing_private_key_enc TEXT, -- JWK, AES-256-GCM encrypted with vault key
sharing_private_key_iv VARCHAR(64), -- base64 12-byte nonce for private key encryption
-- Account recovery
recovery_enc_salt VARCHAR(128), -- enc_key_salt re-encrypted with recovery key (base64)
recovery_iv VARCHAR(64) -- base64 12-byte nonce for recovery_enc_salt
);
-- Folders
CREATE TABLE folders (
id INT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
user_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
name VARCHAR(128) NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
);
-- Vault Items (all sensitive fields AES-256-GCM encrypted client-side)
CREATE TABLE vault_items (
id INT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
user_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
folder_id INT UNSIGNED,
item_type VARCHAR(20) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'password', -- plain string, not ENUM
name VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, -- non-sensitive server label (item type only)
enc_data TEXT NOT NULL, -- base64 AES-256-GCM ciphertext of item payload
iv VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL, -- base64 12-byte GCM nonce for enc_data
enc_name TEXT, -- base64 AES-256-GCM ciphertext of item name
iv_name VARCHAR(64), -- base64 12-byte GCM nonce for enc_name
created_at DATETIME DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at DATETIME DEFAULT NOW() ON UPDATE NOW(),
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
FOREIGN KEY (folder_id) REFERENCES folders(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
);
-- Token Blacklist (JWT revocation)
CREATE TABLE token_blacklist (
id INT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
jti VARCHAR(36) UNIQUE NOT NULL,
user_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
expires_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
INDEX (jti), INDEX (expires_at)
);
-- Shared Items (ECDH zero-knowledge sharing)
CREATE TABLE shared_items (
id INT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
item_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
owner_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
recipient_email VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
recipient_id INT UNSIGNED,
item_name VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, -- plaintext display name for share inbox
item_type VARCHAR(20) NOT NULL,
enc_data TEXT NOT NULL,
iv VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
accepted TINYINT(1) DEFAULT 0,
created_at DATETIME DEFAULT NOW(),
FOREIGN KEY (item_id) REFERENCES vault_items(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
);
-- Emergency Access
CREATE TABLE emergency_access (
id INT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
grantor_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
grantee_email VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
grantee_id INT UNSIGNED,
wait_days INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 7,
status VARCHAR(20) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'invited',
request_initiated_at DATETIME,
enc_vault TEXT,
created_at DATETIME DEFAULT NOW(),
FOREIGN KEY (grantor_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
FOREIGN KEY (grantee_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
);
-- Audit Logs
CREATE TABLE audit_logs (
id INT UNSIGNED AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
user_id INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL,
action VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
resource_type VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
resource_id INT UNSIGNED,
detail VARCHAR(512),
ip_address VARCHAR(45),
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
INDEX (user_id), INDEX (created_at)
);
```
---
## Security Model
- **Zero-knowledge:** master password never sent to server
- `authHash = PBKDF2(masterPassword, email, 100_000 iter)` — sent to server for auth only
- `vaultKey = PBKDF2(masterPassword, enc_key_salt, 600_000 iter)` — stays in browser memory only
- All vault data (payload + item name) encrypted client-side (AES-256-GCM) before sending to server
- **Item name encryption:** `enc_name`/`iv_name` store the AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the item name. The server's plaintext `name` column holds only the item type (e.g. `"password"`) as a non-sensitive audit label. Legacy items without `enc_name` fall back to `name` transparently.
- **Server-side:** Argon2id hash of the client-derived `authHash` (double-hashed for depth)
- **JWT:** HS256, access token 15 min, refresh token 7 days, unique JTI per token
- **JWT blacklist:** on logout both tokens are blacklisted by JTI; refresh rotates tokens
- **MFA:** TOTP (pyotp), secret stored AES-256-GCM encrypted in `users.totp_secret`/`totp_iv`
- **Sharing:** ECDH P-256 — shared secret derived client-side, re-encrypts item plaintext
- **Emergency access:** same ECDH re-encryption; wait timer enforced server-side
- **CSRF:** Flask-WTF on page-serving routes; API blueprints CSRF-exempt (JWT bearer auth)
- **Rate limiting:** Flask-Limiter (Redis-backed in production); Nginx dual-zone as second layer
- **HTTP security headers:** HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, CSP via `@app.after_request`
- **Password generator (extension):** Fully CSPRNG — `_cryptoRandInt()` uses rejection-sampling with `crypto.getRandomValues()`. `Math.random()` is never called anywhere in the generator.
- **Decrypted vault data in extension:** Stored in `chrome.storage.session` only (memory-only, cleared on browser close). Never written to `chrome.storage.local`.
- **Breach detection:** Security dashboard runs HaveIBeenPwned k-anonymity checks — only the first 5 chars of each password's SHA-1 hash are transmitted. Passwords never leave the browser.
---
## Extension Storage Architecture — Critical Rules
### Storage area decision table
| Data | Where stored | Why |
|---|---|---|
| `access_token`, `vault_key_jwk`, `vault_items`, `vault_items_cs` | `chrome.storage.session` | Memory-only, cleared on browser close. Decrypted data must never persist to disk. |
| `refresh_token`, `enc_key_salt`, `pending_save`, `save_blocklist`, `idle_lock_seconds` | `chrome.storage.local` | Persists across browser restarts and SW termination. |
### `vault_items_cs` is in `chrome.storage.session`, NOT `chrome.storage.local`
As of the current codebase, `vault_items_cs` (the decrypted vault cache for content scripts) is written to **`chrome.storage.session`**. This is a deliberate security decision — decrypted passwords must never be persisted to disk.
**Minimum Chrome version required: 111 (March 2023).** `chrome.storage.session` is not readable by content scripts on Chrome ≤ 110. The `storage.onChanged` listener in `content.js` watches `area === 'session'`.
> ⚠️ **The original CLAUDE.md stated `vault_items_cs` lives in `chrome.storage.local`. That is no longer correct.** If you see it reverting to `local`, that is a regression — revert it.
### `chrome.storage.onChanged` area guard
```js
chrome.storage.onChanged.addListener(function(changes, area) {
if (area === 'session' && changes.vault_items_cs) { // 'session', not 'local'
...
}
});
```
### `pending_save` must remain in `chrome.storage.local`
`chrome.storage.session` is wiped when the MV3 service worker is killed (within seconds of inactivity). `pending_save` stays in `local` so the save prompt survives SW restarts.
---
## Key Implementation Decisions & Gotchas
### Item name is encrypted client-side (`enc_name` / `iv_name`)
The `name` column in `vault_items` is **not** sensitive — it stores only the item type string (e.g. `"password"`) as a server-side audit label. The real display name is stored as AES-256-GCM ciphertext in `enc_name` with nonce `iv_name`.
**On load:** `loadVault()` / `fetchAndDecryptVault()` decrypt `enc_name` after decrypting `enc_data` and override `item.name` with the plaintext. Legacy items without `enc_name` use the server's `name` field as fallback — no migration of existing rows required.
**On save:** `handleFormSubmit()` (web app) and `addItemToVault()` / `saveCredential()` (extension) call `Crypto.encryptName(vaultKey, name)` / `ExtCrypto.encryptName(vaultKey, name)` before POSTing, sending `enc_name` + `iv_name` alongside `enc_data` + `iv`.
**On password change / recovery:** The re-encryption loops in `auth.py` also update `vault_item.enc_name` / `vault_item.iv_name` when the client sends updated values.
**API contract:** `POST /api/vault` and `PUT /api/vault/<id>` now accept optional `enc_name` and `iv_name` fields. The `name` field is still required (used as the server-side label).
### Password generator is fully CSPRNG
`generatePassword()` in `extension/popup/popup.js` uses `_cryptoRandInt(max)` for all random selection:
```js
function _cryptoRandInt(max) {
// Rejection sampling — no modulo bias.
const limit = Math.floor(0x100000000 / max) * max;
const buf = new Uint32Array(1);
do { crypto.getRandomValues(buf); } while (buf[0] >= limit);
return buf[0] % max;
}
```
This replaces `Math.floor(Math.random() * n)` which was used in the required-character selection and Fisher-Yates shuffle steps. `Math.random()` is not called anywhere in the generator.
### `_isLikelyUsernameField()` — credential field detection heuristic
`findUsernameField()` in `content.js` no longer accepts any `input[type="text"]` preceding the password field. It scores candidates via `_isLikelyUsernameField()`:
1. **Definite YES:** `autocomplete="username"` or `"email"` or `"tel"`
2. **Definite NO:** Non-credential `autocomplete` values (`name`, `given-name`, `organization`, `search`, etc.)
3. **Keyword scan YES:** `name`, `id`, `placeholder`, or `aria-label` contain `user|email|mail|login|phone|tel|mobile|account`
4. **Otherwise:** field is not decorated
`input[type="email"]` and `input[type="tel"]` are always accepted without scoring.
### `_normaliseUrl()` — bare-domain URL matching
Both `content.js` and `popup.js` include a `_normaliseUrl()` helper that prepends `https://` to URLs that lack a scheme before passing them to `new URL()`. This prevents silent match failures for vault items stored with bare domains (e.g. `"github.com"` instead of `"https://github.com"`).
```js
function _normaliseUrl(raw) {
if (!raw) return null;
const s = raw.trim();
if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(s)) return s;
if (s.startsWith('//')) return 'https:' + s;
return 'https://' + s;
}
```
### MutationObserver guards against extension's own DOM mutations
The `MutationObserver` in `content.js` inspects every mutation before calling `decorateFields()`. If every added/removed node carries a `__pk` class or id prefix, the callback returns early — preventing re-decoration loops on SPAs triggered by the extension injecting or removing its own dropdown or icon buttons.
### `showDropdown` is debounced on `input` events
The `input` event listener on decorated fields wraps `showDropdown` with a 150 ms debounce via `_debounce()`. The `focus` listener remains instant. This eliminates visible lag on large vaults when the user types quickly.
### Three-dot menu is now a proper flyout
The `data-menu` button in the popup renders a `.pk-flyout` div anchored below the button. Menu items are built dynamically from what the item has — "Open URL" only if `plain.url` exists, etc. Styled via `.pk-flyout` / `.pk-flyout-item` in `popup.css`. Closes on any outside click.
### Copy-username button is a dedicated action
A `data-copy-user` button with a person SVG icon appears at the left of the action row for any item with a username. This replaces the previous behaviour where the three-dot button silently copied the username on click.
### HaveIBeenPwned breach detection
`renderSecurityDashboard()` in `vault.js` is now `async`. After rendering the synchronous sections (Weak / Reused / Old), it fires parallel HIBP API calls for every password item via `checkHibp(password)`:
```js
async function checkHibp(password) {
const hashHex = /* SHA-1 of password via crypto.subtle */;
const prefix = hashHex.slice(0, 5);
const suffix = hashHex.slice(5);
const res = await fetch(`https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/${prefix}`, {
headers: { 'Add-Padding': 'true' },
});
// parse response, find matching suffix, return breach count
}
```
Only the first 5 hex characters of the SHA-1 hash are sent. Passwords never leave the browser. Network errors fail safe (return 0, do not block UI). The HIBP section renders progressively after the synchronous sections.
### `item_type` must be `VARCHAR(20)`, NOT `db.Enum(ItemType)`
Using `db.Enum(ItemType)` with a `str`-based Python enum caused SQLAlchemy to lazy-load the column back as a raw string after commit, making `self.item_type.value` raise `AttributeError`. Use `db.String(20)`.
### `INTEGER(unsigned=True)` requires MySQL dialect type
```python
from sqlalchemy.dialects.mysql import INTEGER
db.Column(INTEGER(unsigned=True), ...)
```
### All datetimes are naive UTC (`datetime.utcnow()`)
Do NOT mix in `datetime.now(timezone.utc)` — mixing causes comparison failures in token blacklist and emergency access wait-timer checks.
### AuditLog must flush before log, then commit together
```python
db.session.add(item)
db.session.flush() # populates item.id
AuditLog.log(user_id=..., action='vault_item.create', resource_id=item.id, ...)
db.session.commit() # commits both atomically
```
For deletes, capture `id` and `name` before the delete flush.
### Extension vault key must be extractable
`extension/shared/crypto.js` uses `extractable: true` so the vault key can be serialised as JWK and stored in `chrome.storage.session`. The web app uses `extractable: false`.
### JWT `sub` claim must be a string (PyJWT 2.x)
Always convert: `'sub': str(user_id)` when generating tokens; `int(payload['sub'])` when reading back.
### TOTP secrets encrypted at rest (server-side)
`totp_secret` stores AES-256-GCM ciphertext; `totp_iv` stores the nonce. Encrypted/decrypted exclusively by `auth_service.encrypt_totp_secret()` / `auth_service.decrypt_totp_secret()`. Generating the key:
```bash
python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"
```
### Extension SSO bridge
`bridge.js` runs on `pwkeeper.ngodanguyen.tech` only and syncs sessions bidirectionally between the web app and the extension. See the original CLAUDE.md for the full bridge flow.
### Autofill uses native HTMLInputElement setter for framework compatibility
```js
const nativeSet = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(HTMLInputElement.prototype, 'value')?.set;
if (nativeSet) nativeSet.call(el, value);
el.dispatchEvent(new Event('input', { bubbles: true }));
el.dispatchEvent(new Event('change', { bubbles: true }));
```
### `reset_db.py` for schema changes (Windows, no flask db CLI)
```bash
python reset_db.py
```
Production schema changes: `flask db upgrade`.
---
## Audit Log System
Every create, edit, and delete action is recorded server-side via `AuditLog.log()`. No sensitive or encrypted values are ever written to the audit log.
### Audit Action Catalog
| Route module | Action string | Trigger |
| -------------- | ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
| `auth.py` | `auth.register` | New account created |
| `auth.py` | `auth.login` | Successful password verification |
| `auth.py` | `auth.login_failed` | Failed password attempt (known email) |
| `auth.py` | `auth.mfa_enable` | TOTP enabled after verification |
| `auth.py` | `auth.mfa_disable` | TOTP disabled after verification |
| `auth.py` | `auth.mfa_verify` | MFA step completed, session tokens issued |
| `auth.py` | `auth.change_password` | Master password changed, vault re-encrypted |
| `auth.py` | `auth.change_password_failed` | Password change rejected — wrong current password |
| `auth.py` | `auth.delete_account` | Account permanently deleted |
| `auth.py` | `auth.delete_account_failed` | Deletion rejected — wrong password |
| `auth.py` | `auth.recovery_setup` | Recovery code configured |
| `auth.py` | `auth.recovery_failed` | Recovery attempt — incorrect code |
| `auth.py` | `auth.recovery_items_denied` | Recovery items fetch — incorrect proof |
| `auth.py` | `auth.recovery_success` | Account recovered, vault re-encrypted |
| `vault.py` | `vault_item.create` | Vault item created |
| `vault.py` | `vault_item.update` | Vault item updated |
| `vault.py` | `vault_item.delete` | Vault item deleted |
| `folders.py` | `folder.create` | Folder created |
| `folders.py` | `folder.update` | Folder renamed |
| `folders.py` | `folder.delete` | Folder deleted |
| `sharing.py` | `sharing_keys.create` | ECDH keypair stored for first time |
| `sharing.py` | `sharing_keys.update` | ECDH keypair replaced |
| `sharing.py` | `shared_item.create` | Item shared with another user |
| `sharing.py` | `shared_item.delete` | Share revoked by owner |
| `sharing.py` | `shared_item.accept` | Recipient accepted a share |
| `emergency.py` | `emergency_access.create` | Emergency access invitation sent |
| `emergency.py` | `emergency_access.delete` | Emergency access grant removed |
| `emergency.py` | `emergency_access.accept` | Grantee accepted invitation |
| `emergency.py` | `emergency_access.provide_vault` | Grantor uploaded encrypted vault snapshot |
| `emergency.py` | `emergency_access.request` | Grantee initiated access request |
| `emergency.py` | `emergency_access.deny` | Grantor denied pending request |
| `emergency.py` | `emergency_access.vault_retrieved` | Grantee fetched vault after wait elapsed |
---
## REST API Endpoints
All `/api/vault/*` and `/api/folders/*` routes require `Authorization: Bearer <access_token>`.
```
POST /api/auth/register
POST /api/auth/login
POST /api/auth/logout
POST /api/auth/refresh
GET /api/auth/me
GET /api/auth/mfa/status
GET /api/auth/mfa/setup
POST /api/auth/mfa/enable
POST /api/auth/mfa/disable
POST /api/auth/mfa/verify
POST /api/auth/change-password # { current_auth_hash, new_auth_hash, new_enc_key_salt,
# items: [{id, enc_data, iv, enc_name?, iv_name?}] }
DELETE /api/auth/account
POST /api/auth/recovery/setup
GET /api/auth/recovery/status
GET /api/auth/recovery/data
GET /api/auth/recovery/items
POST /api/auth/recover
GET /api/vault
POST /api/vault # { name, item_type, folder_id, enc_data, iv, enc_name?, iv_name? }
GET /api/vault/<id>
PUT /api/vault/<id> # accepts enc_name, iv_name
DELETE /api/vault/<id>
GET /api/folders
POST /api/folders
PUT /api/folders/<id>
DELETE /api/folders/<id>
GET /api/sharing/keys
POST /api/sharing/keys
GET /api/sharing/public-key
GET /api/sharing
POST /api/sharing
DELETE /api/sharing/<id>
GET /api/sharing/inbox
POST /api/sharing/inbox/<id>/accept
GET /api/emergency
POST /api/emergency
DELETE /api/emergency/<id>
POST /api/emergency/<id>/accept
POST /api/emergency/<id>/provide
POST /api/emergency/<id>/request
POST /api/emergency/<id>/deny
GET /api/emergency/<id>/vault
```
---
## Development Setup (Windows)
```bash
python -m venv .venv
.venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
# Edit .env: MYSQL_HOST, MYSQL_USER, MYSQL_PASSWORD, MYSQL_DB, SECRET_KEY, JWT_SECRET_KEY, TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY
mysql -u root -p -e "CREATE DATABASE passkeeper CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;"
python reset_db.py
python run.py
```
---
## Production Deployment (Ubuntu + Nginx + Gunicorn + systemd)
```bash
# Schema migrations (all subsequent deployments)
flask db upgrade
# Reload app
sudo systemctl reload passkeeper
```
For full initial setup instructions (Nginx config, systemd unit, Certbot, etc.) refer to the original deployment guide in this file's history or `scripts/passkeeper-nginx.conf` / `scripts/passkeeper.service`.
---
## Python Dependencies (`requirements.txt`)
```
flask>=3.0
flask-sqlalchemy>=3.1
flask-migrate>=4.0
flask-login>=0.6
flask-wtf>=1.2
flask-limiter>=3.5
flask-cors>=4.0
pymysql>=1.1
argon2-cffi>=23.1
pyjwt>=2.8
python-dotenv>=1.0
gunicorn>=21.0
pyotp>=2.9.0
qrcode[pil]>=7.4.2
cryptography>=42.0 # AES-256-GCM server-side TOTP secret encryption
redis>=5.0 # Shared rate-limit storage across Gunicorn workers
```
---
## Migration History
| Revision | Description |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| `71d7158dd3b9` | Add audit_logs table; fix sharing_public_key column type |
| `a1b2c3d4e5f6` | Encrypt TOTP secret at rest (totp_secret → VARCHAR(255), add totp_iv) |
| `b2c3d4e5f6a7` | Add account recovery columns (recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv) |
| `c3d4e5f6a7b8` | Encrypt vault item name (add enc_name, iv_name to vault_items) |
---
## Notes
- Never log decrypted vault data server-side
- All encryption/decryption of vault data (including item names) happens in the browser
- The server stores only encrypted blobs — zero-knowledge architecture
- `enc_key_salt` is not secret on its own — only useful combined with the master password
- **Redis is required in production** for rate limiting. Without it, each Gunicorn worker maintains its own counter.
- **Recovery code is never stored server-side** — only the AES-256-GCM ciphertext of `enc_key_salt`
- **Password change clears the recovery code** — user must regenerate from Account Settings
- **The `#vault-list` element ID must not be renamed** — `vault.js` renders all vault items into it
- **`save_blocklist`** in `chrome.storage.local` stores hostnames for which the save banner is suppressed
- **`vault_items_cs` is in `chrome.storage.session`** — decrypted data never written to disk (changed from `local`)
- **HIBP checks run progressively** — the security dashboard renders synchronous sections first, then fires parallel k-anonymity requests in the background
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