440 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript
440 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* recover.js — Account recovery flow
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*
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* Step 1: User provides email + recovery code.
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* - Fetch recovery data (recovery_enc_salt, recovery_iv, nonce) from server.
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* NOTE: enc_key_salt is NOT returned here — the client must derive it by
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* decrypting the recovery blob with the recovery code.
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* - Derive recovery key from the recovery code (PBKDF2).
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* - Decrypt recovery_enc_salt using the recovery key → decrypted enc_key_salt.
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* - If decryption succeeds, store decrypted enc_key_salt in module state → show step 2.
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*
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* Step 2: User provides new master password.
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* - Derive new vault key from new password + new random enc_key_salt.
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* - Fetch all vault items (still encrypted with old vault key).
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* - Decrypt each item with old vault key (derived from old enc_key_salt + new password
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* would fail — instead we re-derive old vault key from old enc_key_salt + new password
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* which won't work either). Correct path:
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* OLD vault key = PBKDF2(old_master_password, old_enc_key_salt)
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* But we don't have the old master password. The recovery path therefore
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* cannot re-encrypt vault items with a new key unless it can derive the OLD vault key.
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*
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* Recovery key design:
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* recovery_key = PBKDF2(recovery_code, "passkeeper-recovery", 200_000 iter)
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* encrypted blob = AES-GCM(recovery_key, enc_key_salt)
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*
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* After decrypting enc_key_salt, the user sets a new master password:
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* new_auth_hash = PBKDF2(new_password, email, 100_000)
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* new_enc_key_salt = random 16 bytes
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* new_vault_key = PBKDF2(new_password, new_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
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*
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* Vault items are re-encrypted using old_vault_key → new_vault_key:
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* old_vault_key = PBKDF2(recovery_code, old_enc_key_salt, 600_000)
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* — This is the KEY INSIGHT: the recovery code acts as a stand-in master password
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* ONLY for the purpose of re-deriving the old vault key, since the recovery_key
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* already proved the recovery code is correct by successfully decrypting enc_key_salt.
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*
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* The server verifies the recovery code is correct via `recovery_proof`:
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* recovery_proof = old_enc_key_salt (plaintext)
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* If the client decrypted recovery_enc_salt correctly, it will have the true enc_key_salt.
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* The server compares recovery_proof === user.enc_key_salt.
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*/
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const Recover = (() => {
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const subtle = window.crypto.subtle;
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// Module state between step 1 and step 2
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let _email = null;
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let _recoveryCode = null;
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let _oldEncKeySalt = null; // decrypted from recovery blob
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let _oldVaultKey = null; // derived for re-encrypting vault items
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let _recoveryProof = null; // HMAC-SHA256(enc_key_salt_bytes, nonce) — sent as proof
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// ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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function strToBytes(str) {
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return new TextEncoder().encode(str);
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}
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function base64ToBytes(b64) {
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const bin = atob(b64);
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const bytes = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
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for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) bytes[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
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return bytes;
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}
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function bytesToBase64(bytes) {
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let bin = "";
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bytes.forEach((b) => (bin += String.fromCharCode(b)));
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return btoa(bin);
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}
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function formatRecoveryCode(raw) {
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// Display as groups of 4 for readability
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return raw.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join("-") ?? raw;
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}
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function cleanRecoveryCode(input) {
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// Strip hyphens/spaces so users can paste formatted or raw codes
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return input.replace(/[-\s]/g, "").toLowerCase();
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}
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function showError(id, message) {
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const el = document.getElementById(id);
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if (el) {
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el.textContent = message;
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el.classList.remove("hidden");
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}
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}
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function hideError(id) {
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const el = document.getElementById(id);
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if (el) el.classList.add("hidden");
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}
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function setLoading(btn, loading) {
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btn.disabled = loading;
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btn.textContent = loading
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? btn.dataset.loadingText || "Please wait…"
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: btn.dataset.originalText || btn.textContent;
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}
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// ── Crypto ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Derive an AES-256-GCM key from the recovery code using PBKDF2.
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* Salt is fixed to 'passkeeper-recovery' — the recovery code itself is the secret.
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*/
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async function deriveRecoveryKey(recoveryCode) {
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const baseKey = await subtle.importKey(
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"raw",
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strToBytes(recoveryCode),
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"PBKDF2",
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false,
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["deriveKey"],
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);
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return subtle.deriveKey(
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{
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name: "PBKDF2",
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salt: strToBytes("passkeeper-recovery"),
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iterations: 200_000,
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hash: "SHA-256",
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},
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baseKey,
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{ name: "AES-GCM", length: 256 },
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false,
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["encrypt", "decrypt"],
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);
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}
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/**
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* Encrypt enc_key_salt (string) with the recovery key.
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* Returns { recovery_enc_salt: base64, recovery_iv: base64 }
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*/
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async function encryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, encKeySalt) {
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const iv = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
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const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(
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{ name: "AES-GCM", iv },
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recoveryKey,
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strToBytes(encKeySalt),
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);
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return {
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recovery_enc_salt: bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(ciphertext)),
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recovery_iv: bytesToBase64(iv),
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};
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}
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/**
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* Decrypt recovery_enc_salt to recover the original enc_key_salt string.
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* Throws DOMException if the recovery code is wrong (GCM auth tag mismatch).
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*/
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async function decryptEncKeySalt(recoveryKey, recoveryEncSalt, recoveryIv) {
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const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(
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{ name: "AES-GCM", iv: base64ToBytes(recoveryIv) },
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recoveryKey,
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base64ToBytes(recoveryEncSalt),
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);
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return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext);
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}
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/**
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* Compute the HMAC-SHA256 recovery proof.
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* proof = HMAC-SHA256(key=enc_key_salt_bytes, msg=nonce_bytes)
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*
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* This proves to the server that the client correctly decrypted the recovery
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* blob (and therefore holds the right recovery code) without transmitting
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* enc_key_salt in plaintext.
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*/
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async function computeRecoveryProof(encKeySalt, nonce) {
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const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(
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"raw",
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strToBytes(encKeySalt),
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{ name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },
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false,
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["sign"],
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);
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const signature = await subtle.sign("HMAC", keyMaterial, strToBytes(nonce));
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// Convert to hex string to match Python's hmac.hexdigest()
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return Array.from(new Uint8Array(signature))
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.map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
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.join("");
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}
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// ── Step 1: Verify recovery code ───────────────────────────────────────────
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async function handleStep1(e) {
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e.preventDefault();
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hideError("recover-error-1");
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const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
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btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
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setLoading(btn, true);
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try {
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const email = document
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.getElementById("recover-email")
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.value.trim()
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.toLowerCase();
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const rawCode = cleanRecoveryCode(
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document.getElementById("recover-code").value.trim(),
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);
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if (!email || !rawCode) {
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showError("recover-error-1", "Email and recovery code are required.");
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return;
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}
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// Fetch recovery blobs from server
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const res = await fetch(
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`/api/auth/recovery/data?email=${encodeURIComponent(email)}`,
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);
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if (!res.ok) {
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showError(
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"recover-error-1",
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"No recovery code found for this account.",
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);
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return;
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}
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const data = await res.json();
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// Attempt to decrypt enc_key_salt using the recovery code
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const recoveryKey = await deriveRecoveryKey(rawCode);
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let decryptedEncKeySalt;
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try {
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decryptedEncKeySalt = await decryptEncKeySalt(
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recoveryKey,
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data.recovery_enc_salt,
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data.recovery_iv,
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);
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} catch {
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showError(
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"recover-error-1",
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"Invalid recovery code. Please check and try again.",
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);
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return;
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}
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// Compute HMAC-SHA256 proof: proves we correctly decrypted the blob
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// without sending enc_key_salt in plaintext.
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const proof = await computeRecoveryProof(decryptedEncKeySalt, data.nonce);
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// Derive the old vault key using the recovery code as master password proxy
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_oldVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(rawCode, decryptedEncKeySalt);
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_email = email;
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_recoveryCode = rawCode;
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_oldEncKeySalt = decryptedEncKeySalt;
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_recoveryProof = proof;
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// Show step 2
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document.getElementById("recover-step-1").classList.add("hidden");
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document.getElementById("recover-step-2").classList.remove("hidden");
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document.getElementById("recover-new-pass").focus();
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} catch (err) {
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showError(
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"recover-error-1",
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"An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.",
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);
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console.error(err);
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} finally {
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setLoading(btn, false);
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}
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}
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// ── Step 2: Set new password + re-encrypt vault ────────────────────────────
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async function handleStep2(e) {
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e.preventDefault();
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hideError("recover-error-2");
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const btn = e.target.querySelector('[type="submit"]');
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btn.dataset.originalText = btn.textContent;
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setLoading(btn, true);
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try {
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const newPassword = document.getElementById("recover-new-pass").value;
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const confirmPassword = document.getElementById(
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"recover-confirm-pass",
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).value;
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if (newPassword !== confirmPassword) {
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showError("recover-error-2", "Passwords do not match.");
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return;
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}
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if (newPassword.length < 12) {
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showError(
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"recover-error-2",
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"Password must be at least 12 characters.",
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);
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return;
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}
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// Derive new credentials
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const newAuthHash = await Crypto.deriveAuthHash(newPassword, _email);
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const newEncKeySalt = Crypto.generateSalt(16);
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const newVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(
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newPassword,
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newEncKeySalt,
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);
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// Fetch all vault items (encrypted with old vault key)
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// We use a minimal unauthenticated fetch here — items are still ciphertext on the wire.
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// We need a temporary token. Since we haven't authenticated yet, we use recovery_proof
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// to get a token from the /recover endpoint directly.
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// For the item fetch step, we issue the recovery call with empty items first to get tokens,
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// then re-encrypt. However, to keep this atomic, we fetch items via a pre-recovery token.
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// Simpler correct approach: fetch items as part of the /recover payload.
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// We'll get a session token only after /recover succeeds. So we must send items inline.
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// Fetch vault items using a preliminary unauthenticated endpoint is not ideal.
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// Instead: call /recover with items=[] to get a session token, fetch items, re-encrypt,
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// then call /api/auth/change-password to update. But that's two round trips and not atomic.
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// Correct atomic approach: use the recovery endpoint directly with all re-encrypted items.
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// To fetch items without auth, we need to log in with the old vault key... which we can't.
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// Solution: the /recover endpoint issues tokens. We fetch items BEFORE calling /recover
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// using no auth (items are ciphertext anyway, safe to expose to the authenticated session),
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// OR we make /recover accept an optional items array and handle both cases.
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// Implemented here: call /recover with items included.
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// But we need items to re-encrypt first. To get items, we must be authenticated.
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// We solve this by having the server issue a temporary session from /recover/data endpoint,
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// or more practically: fetch items unauthenticated with just the email to get encrypted blobs.
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// Since items are ciphertext and we verify recovery code server-side, this is acceptable.
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// Fetch items unauthenticated via a recovery-scoped endpoint
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const itemsRes = await fetch(
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`/api/auth/recovery/items?email=${encodeURIComponent(_email)}`,
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{
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headers: { "X-Recovery-Proof": _recoveryProof },
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},
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);
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let reEncryptedItems = [];
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if (itemsRes.ok) {
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const itemsData = await itemsRes.json();
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// Re-encrypt each item: old vault key → new vault key
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for (const item of itemsData.items) {
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try {
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const plain = await Crypto.decryptItem(
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_oldVaultKey,
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item.enc_data,
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item.iv,
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);
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const { enc_data, iv } = await Crypto.encryptItem(
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newVaultKey,
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plain,
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);
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reEncryptedItems.push({ id: item.id, enc_data, iv });
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} catch {
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// Item decryption failed — skip (shouldn't happen if recovery code is correct)
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console.warn(`Could not re-encrypt item ${item.id}`);
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}
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}
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}
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// Submit recovery
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const recoverRes = await fetch("/api/auth/recover", {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
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body: JSON.stringify({
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email: _email,
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new_auth_hash: newAuthHash,
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new_enc_key_salt: newEncKeySalt,
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recovery_proof: _recoveryProof,
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items: reEncryptedItems,
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}),
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});
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const recoverData = await recoverRes.json();
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if (!recoverRes.ok) {
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showError(
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"recover-error-2",
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recoverData.error || "Recovery failed. Please try again.",
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);
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return;
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}
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// Store session and redirect
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sessionStorage.setItem("access_token", recoverData.access_token);
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localStorage.setItem("refresh_token", recoverData.refresh_token);
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sessionStorage.setItem("enc_key_salt", recoverData.enc_key_salt);
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// Set vault key in VaultSession so unlock overlay is skipped
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const finalVaultKey = await Crypto.deriveVaultKey(
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newPassword,
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recoverData.enc_key_salt,
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);
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VaultSession.setKey(finalVaultKey);
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window.location.href = "/vault?recovered=1";
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} catch (err) {
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showError(
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"recover-error-2",
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"An unexpected error occurred. Please try again.",
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);
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console.error(err);
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} finally {
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setLoading(btn, false);
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}
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}
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// ── Init ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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function init() {
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document
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.getElementById("recover-form-step1")
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?.addEventListener("submit", handleStep1);
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document
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.getElementById("recover-form-step2")
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?.addEventListener("submit", handleStep2);
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const toggleBtn = document.getElementById("toggle-recover-pass");
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const passInput = document.getElementById("recover-new-pass");
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if (toggleBtn && passInput) {
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toggleBtn.addEventListener("click", () => {
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passInput.type = passInput.type === "password" ? "text" : "password";
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});
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}
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}
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// Public surface needed by recover.html (no VaultSession on recover page)
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return { init };
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})();
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// Minimal VaultSession stub (not used during recovery but imported by crypto.js chain)
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const VaultSession = (() => {
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let _key = null;
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return {
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setKey(k) {
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_key = k;
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},
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getKey() {
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return _key;
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},
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clear() {
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_key = null;
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},
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};
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})();
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document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", Recover.init);
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